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Abstract
This work examines the existence and extent of polarization in the American electorate as
a contemporary phenomenon based in hyper-partisan or “tribal1” identity rather than as arising
out of a more conventional ideological framework. This approach allows for the bypassing of
more conventional questions such as the meaning of “liberal” or “conservative” or “in virtue of
what is someone a liberal/conservative?”, and instead allows acceptance of a respondent’s
ideological or partisan self-identification as a convenient label which does not require a
monolithic set of political beliefs for its basis, although the prior or subsequent adoption of such
a set of beliefs is not precluded. This framework’s major advantage is its parsimonious
explanation of the contemporary American political environment, especially at the
macropolitical level. It includes a contribution to the literature through the development of
ideological and partisan indicators based in attitudes rather than issue preferences and proposes
improvements to the currently used methods of placing and determining ideological attitudes. It
cannot resolve the differences between approaches such as behavioralism and institutionalism as
the act of adopting an identity is an individual behavior per se, which occurs within an
institutional setting that limits the set of policies which can be preferred and the set of identities
which can be adopted or ascribed. It does, however, allow these disparate approaches to coexist.
This framework is in many ways an a priori construct and should be viewed as a broad outline
for future work rather than a complete theoretical model. It defines critical terms and concepts,
examines arguments for and critiques of ideologically grounded explanations before outlining
and demonstrating the partisan identity framework. It uses survey data from ANES and other
sources to compare the explanatory power of the differing approaches, discusses the implications
of those analyses, identifies unanswered questions, outlines the direction of future inquiry, and
concludes.

1

Throughout this work, the word “tribal” is used in its Latin (tribus) sense of division based in group identity. Any
other meaning is neither intended nor implied.
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Chapter 1: Definitions and Conceptualization
At the 1992 Republican National Convention, Pat Buchanan declared, “There is a
religious war going on in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we
shall be as the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.” (C-SPAN 1992, 27:58).
This declaration, while undoubtedly intended to support his portrayal of the Republican Party as
siding with the “good guys,” was most probably an allusion to James Hunter’s 1991 book,
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, in which Hunter proposed the polarization of
American society over issues such as gun control, abortion, gay rights, and other sociocultural
issues which had entered the national political discourse and become highly salient and divisive
during the previous decades. Political scientists were not slow to note that the tenor of that
national discourse had been deteriorating for some time, so began investigating both the division
and its extent and qualities. This paper continues and extends that line of inquiry by proposing
that these divisions and their effects are due to identity-based attitudes and affiliations rather than
ideological ones. This chapter will examine some of the critical terms and concepts necessary for
the following chapters. Most importantly, it will define what polarization is, conduct a limited
examination of what it is not, and examine the how polarization might occur within the
framework of the traditional median voter theorem.
Perhaps the most prolific of the polarization researchers, Alan Abramowitz and Morris
Fiorina, have engaged in voluminous debate which has run over the course of about 13 years,
although they have less directly engaged for about 20 years. Abramowitz has essentially
maintained that the American electorate not only was and is polarized but that the extent and
quality of that polarization is increasing (Abramowitz 2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2018;
Abramowitz and Fiorina 2013; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2005, 2006, 2008). Fiorina has
1

maintained that the American electorate was and remains mostly centrist in its views and that
any perception of polarization is primarily attributable to the small but noisy extremes of the
ideological spectrum and the increasing ideological homogeneity (sorting) of the two major
parties (Abramowitz and Fiorina 2013; Fiorina 1999 and 2017; Fiorina and Abrams 2006 and
2010; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005 (2011) and 2008; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006). Both
sides have collected their fair share of adherents, and many of the underlying questions remain
unsettled. Abraham Lincoln’s Meditation on the Divine Will might seem particularly appropriate
to this situation (“both may be and one must be wrong”), but there are alternative interpretations
which allow for both sides to be correct and accurate in their versions of what the data say,
although not necessarily in their interpretations of what those data mean. Political philosopher
Lawrence Cahoone (2014) proposed what he termed the “political continuum hypothesis” to
explain the proliferation of political positions: given any linear spectrum of political positions
and any two points on that spectrum, a third point will be invented which occupies a position
between the first two. This can be and is commonly accomplished by shifting the meaning of
and/or emphasis on important terms but can also be done by crafting a compromise position
which contains a bit from each, or by other means. I do not believe a compromise position can be
crafted without resorting to semantic devices as the two arguments are firmly grounded in
differing conceptions of “the electorate,” among other things, but the nature and implications of
polarization can be bridged by demonstrating that the basis of its more malignant effects is not in
ideological or issue divergence, but elsewhere. This allows both sides’ data and findings to
coexist as differing components of a larger framework.
DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) proposed the generally accepted position that
polarization in its political sense has two meanings: it can be taken to refer to a state or condition

2

in one sense, while it can refer to a process in the other. Both usages are correct. As a descriptor
of a state or condition, one must be clear that polarization is not a switch that is either on or off,
but a classification of the degree of divergence between two positions or a qualitative description
of how that divergence manifests among people who hold those positions. As a measure of
positional divergence, thinking of that measure as a speedometer may be an apt analogy. One can
look at a sufficiently precise speedometer and claim that some object is moving at a rate of x
mph/kph and expect that another person looking at the same speedometer would agree on the
reading. One cannot look at that same speedometer and claim that the object is moving “fast” or
“slow” and confidently expect agreement as the terms require an agreed upon standard to which
the speed may be compared. In this respect, “polarized” is a very imprecise term. One may,
subject to objections over measurement and error, claim that x-percent of voters support
something while y-percent oppose it. However, an assertion of that x-amount of divergence
equals polarization is minimally open to objections of arbitrariness. In many respects, the use of
polarization as a descriptor of the level of political disagreement can be seen as similar to the use
of “landslide” as a descriptor of election outcomes; most would agree that a 20-percent or more
margin of victory probably warrants the use of the term, while a single-digit margin of victory
probably does not, but what about margins between 10 and 19 percent? In this same vein, while
divergence, ideology/partisanship, issue positions, and other indicators can be measured, what
level of divergence across how many issues or issue domains between how much of which
segments of the population equates to being “polarized?” Thus, if the respective “polarized” and
“not polarized” conclusions of Abramowitz and Fiorina can be reconciled, one must first closely
examine what they mean by their use of specific terms.

3

1.1

POLARIZATION DEFINED
It would be a supreme overstatement to claim that a definitional gap in the polarization

literature exists, as it is more of a pothole than a chasm, but the vast majority of the polarization
authors fail to define polarization, choosing instead to focus on questions such as “is it
polarized?”, “to what extent is it polarized?”, “who is polarized?”, or “why are they polarized?”
while ignoring the more central question of “what is polarization?” Even Fiorina and
Abramowitz did not explicitly define the term and only a couple of researchers have directly
addressed this question. DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996, p. 693 and hereafter the DiMaggio
group) defined polarization as “the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation
to some theoretical maximum.”2 Fiorina’s and Abramowitz’ works generally adhere to this
definition. Campbell’s (2018, 1) definition of “highly polarized” is “substantial differences in
political perspectives across a single dimension.” Removing the modifiers “highly” and
“substantial” from each side yields “differences in political perspectives,” leaving the amount of
difference and dimensionality as measurement parameters. At a later point Campbell (2018, 16)
adds “intense conflict” to his definition, which compromises the initial definition such that under
the modified definition, polarization may not exist without a measure of both divergence and
conflict, a two-dimensional construct. However, Campbell’s second definition captures the more
salient meaning as intense conflict cannot exist without divergence, but divergence can exist
without intense conflict. Returning to Campbell’s initial definition, one can safely start from the
idea that polarization, taken broadly and in its political sense, is the degree to which opinions on
political issues diverge, perhaps with or without the limiting qualification of those issues where
there can be, and perhaps should be, a reasonable divergence in the larger discourse.

2

The DiMaggio group’s examination of polarization actually focused on the degree of deviation from centrality, but
this does not detract from the definition.

4

Mundane questions, such as “should we paint the kitchen?” logically have only two
possible answers, “yes” and “no,” as do more momentous ones, such as “should we declare
war?”3 However, to call painting the kitchen a polarizing question perhaps says more about the
condition of the relationships within the household than it does about the condition of the
kitchen, and this analogy may be extensible to the political arena. For example, a recent
legislative argument over whether Pennsylvania’s official state amphibian should be the Eastern
Hellbender (the “snot otter”) or Wehrle’s Salamander (Calvert 2017) likely says more about the
personalities in Pennsylvania’s legislative leadership4 than what Pennsylvania’s state amphibian
should be, whether the people of Pennsylvania have a preference on the issue, or even if
Pennsylvanians believe they should have a state amphibian at all.
If polarization is the divergence of opinions on political issues and the degree of
divergence is the measure of the severity of the condition, then a central question becomes one of
what polarization looks like. In graphic form (see Figure 1.1 below), most observers would
accept this as a nonpolarized distribution. All opposing points are equidistant from the mean
(which is also the median) and the tails are equally distributed; it is a classic Gaussian or
“normal” distribution. If imagined as a distribution of responses on something like a Likert-type
preference scale, the average response is neutral relative to the object of the question with less
than 5% of respondents holding extreme positions on it (e.g. strongly favoring or opposing).

3

“Just war” is the generally accepted tradition in the United States, so “should we declare war?” might be more
properly restated as “is going to war justified?” However, some recent injections of “holy war” justifications may be
capable making the degree of justification a relevant question.
4 This does not give the appearance of being a partisan or even a pragmatic issue. In 2017, Pennsylvania’s state
Senate was composed of 50 Senators (16 Democrats and 34 Republicans) who overwhelmingly (47-2) supported the
bill designating the Eastern Hellbender as the state amphibian. The House majority leader, Dave Reed, who
represents the area in which Wehrle’s Salamander was discovered, put the brakes on the question and it had not been
brought to a vote in the lower chamber at the time of this writing, over a year later.

5

Figure 1.1: Normal Distribution

Figure 1.2: Bimodal Distribution

Figure 1.2 (above), by contrast, also shows all opposing points as equidistant from the
mean (which is also the median), and the tails are still equally distributed, but this would be seen
by most observers as a polarized distribution, or something close to it. Viewed as a scaled
response set, most respondents hold very strong and opposing opinions while very few occupy
the neutral ground. In both cases no proposition has the support of a majority of respondents, but
in the first case, a reasonable interpretation might be that a compromise position is either held or
desired by the majority, while in the second case a compromise position acceptable to the
majority may be unobtainable. Keeping in mind that DiMaggio, et al. (1996) require the absence
of a compromise position while Cahoone (2014) proposes its inevitable emergence, an additional
caution regarding these interpretations is in order. If reduced to a sharper yes/no question, and
assuming those in the absolute neutral position are equally likely to come down on either side of
6

the question, the result would be an inconclusive 50:50 split. This example illustrates Fiorina’s
(2011) remarks about much information being lost when a spectrum of opinion is reduced to a
dichotomous choice.
The late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan reportedly quipped that “you are entitled to
your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts” (Penny 2003). This idea leads to a
further amendment of the starting definition such that at its most basic, polarization is the degree
of divergence or separation of opinion or position on a given normative question. This change
produces some of its own problems as most political questions do not reduce to positive
considerations of, for example, what the tax rate is, but rather normative ones of what it should
be. But “should be” becomes possible only after reaching a conclusion that “is” is inadequate.
Returning to the mundane example of painting the kitchen, the question of “should we paint?”
logically has only two possible answers, but it is founded on deeper considerations:
•

The question of the current condition of the kitchen is positive; it can be
objectively measured.

•

The question of whether its current condition has reached a point of
unacceptability requiring action on the part of the homeowners is normative.
While the factors that lead to the determination of acceptableness can be
identified, counted, and controlled for, there is too much subjectivity in the
importance of those measures. This is one of the areas where polarized
perspectives could manifest.

•

The questions of resource availability and associated opportunity costs are
positive.

7

•

The question of whether the expected utility of inaction is outweighed by the
expected utility of action is not fully one or the other. Expected utility would
normally be classified as a positive issue as it can, with a healthy dose of ceteris
paribus, be empirically measured. But the underlying utility is a normative
consideration as it will vary by actor and is thus utility is neither completely
positive nor normative. This, too, is an area where polarized perspectives could
show effects.

With a working definition of polarization as being the amount of divergence between
opinions on normative questions, it becomes necessary to distinguish the behaviors that are
commonly identified as being polarized.
1.2

PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION
As used in current political discussion, polarization describes a condition of either the

whole or various subsets of the general electorate which has persisted since the late 1960s or
early 1970s, where political elites and some segments of the larger population engage in loud and
often heated disagreement over a broad range of issues. However, when this usage appears in the
literature, the term strongly implies partisan polarization5 and generally centers around the
conflicts between the two major political parties rather than the more benign give-and-take of
constructive political discourse. While a full historical examination of its sources is outside the
scope of the present work, these larger divisions have been variously attributed to racial issues
arising after the 1958 midterm elections (Carmines and Stimson 1989), the conflicts over civil
rights and Vietnam of the mid- and late 1960s (Campbell 2018), Reagan-era congressional
reforms (Rhode 1991), or the 1994 mid-term elections (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998 and
5

Abramowitz initially structured his side of the argument in terms of ideological polarization, but his later works
(Abramowitz 2018 in particular) have shifted more toward partisanship as the basis of polarization.

8

Mann and Ornstein 2013), among others. The use of the 1994 midterms explanation is elitedriven; Mann and Ornstein emphasize the Republican House campaigns, led by Newt Gingrich
and others, and their delegitimization of the Congress as the main explanatory factor. Echoes of
this can be found more than 20 years later in the 2016 Trump campaign’s “drain the swamp”
rhetoric, although the Democrats have utilized similar rhetoric (“culture of corruption”),
indicating that neither party has particularly clean hands in this regard. It should also be noted
that “running against Washington” has a long history in American federal election campaigns, so
Mann and Ornstein’s assertion goes mostly to intensity rather than existence.
Poole and Rosenthal (1983) developed the D-NOMINATE dataset as a response to a gap
noted by McCrae (1958) between the ability to order positions within the spatial model and the
need to be able to reliably calculate the distance between those positions. They have continued to
refine this system in the years since, resulting in the current DW-NOMINATE, which allows for
a variety of spatial comparisons between members of Congress who did not serve at the same
time. While it has the capability of placing legislators within a multi-dimensional space, most
legislative outcomes can be explained in terms of the first (liberal-conservative) dimension,
especially since the realignment of the South. Legislators’ scores range from -1 (most liberal) to
1 (most conservative), so a few measures present themselves as useful points of comparison. The
variation of the distance between the mean party positions is used as evidence of both the
existence and degree of congressional polarization. The few Independents in Congress would be
appropriate to include for calculation of chamber mean and median positions but have been
excluded for purposes of making party comparisons. I use a somewhat arbitrary starting point of
the 86th Congress in order to establish the 1960s as a baseline for comparison and stop at the
113th Congress (2013-2015) as this Congress resulted from the 2012 election cycle, which was

9

the last round of ANES data used by most of the authors upon whom I am relying. 6 I am not
controlling for South, which deserves its own examination somewhere else, but will note that
following the collapse of the old New Deal Coalition in the late 1960s, the upward (conservative)
pull on the Democrat mean position began to weaken and by the end of the 1980s, there is little
utility in controlling for South as the lines for southern and non-southern Democrats mostly
parallel the Democrat line, perhaps effectively delineating the upper and lower bounds of the
party, but more likely serving only to illustrate that southern Democrats remain more
conservative than their non-southern counterparts.
Figure 1.3 (below) shows the difference between the mean positions of the two parties in
the House of Representatives. The difference has been growing steadily from about 1980 through
2015, but variance in the mean position of the Democratic Party (average term-to-term variation
of 0.005) is significantly less than the variation of its Republican counterpart (average term-toterm variation of 0.018), calling into question the assertion that congressional polarization is
largely caused by both parties moving toward more extreme positions. Over the period being
examined, Democratic representatives moved a cumulative 0.134 closer to the liberal end of the
spectrum, while Republican representatives moved 0.494 closer to the conservative end. The
realignment of southern congressional districts can account for some the downward pressure on
the Democratic line but cannot alone account for the more extreme upward movement of the
Republican line. Thus, the Democratic Party in the House has become slightly more liberal while
the House Republican Party has become significantly more conservative. Figure 1.4 (below)
graphs the change in the difference between the mean positions of both parties in the House over
the same time period.

6

The 2016 election data was added to the CDF in mid-2018 but was unavailable as its own dataset until mid-2017.
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Figure 1.3: Mean House Party Position, 86th-113th Congress

Figure 1.4: Difference in Mean House Party Position, 86th-113th Congress

Figures 1.5 and 1.6 (below) show the same information for the Senate. Again, there is
some downward pressure on the Democrat line, due at least in part to the realignment of the
South, but there is greater upward movement on the Republican line than can be accounted for
by that realignment. As was the case in the House, Democratic senators became slightly more
liberal over time, moving 0.144 closer to the liberal pole (average session-to-session variation is
11

0.005), while Republican senators became significantly more conservative, moving 0.299 closer
to the conservative pole (average session-to-session variation is 0.012). The Senate results call
into question the commonly advanced argument that district gerrymandering is a major cause of
congressional polarization since Senate boundaries are not subject to redistricting and divergence
is noticeably active in both chambers. While this is a much simpler approach to the
gerrymandering question than that taken by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2008) 7, the
conclusions are effectively the same. The longer time horizons and differing legislative style of
the Senate may account for some of the smaller variations in the mean Senate positions in
comparison to the House positions but Theriault and Rohde (2011) find most of the causality
among Republican senators who served in the House after 1978, rather than the other
explanations.
Figure 1.5: Mean Senate Party Position, 86th-113th Congress

7

McCarty, et al., compared House delegations from single-district states to those from states subject to
reapportionment, concluding that district gerrymandering could account for no more than about 10%-15% of the
variation in the House divergence, but if examined at the individual district level, the difference in variation was
indistinguishable from zero.

12

Figure 1.6: Difference in Mean Senate Party Position, 86th-113th Congress

In contrast to these other explanations, Hetherington (2009) and Layman, et al. (2006)
argue that partisan polarization has been the norm for most of the country’s history, with the
more consociational and bipartisan character of the three or four post-WWII decades being
anomalous. While the existence and timing of partisan polarization in the past has been and
likely will continue to be the subject of academic debate, the present-day effect has been the
emergence of two parties with clearly different and opposing policy agendas, a growing incivility
and occasional outright partisan antagonism in political discourse, which give every indication of
having become the new normal in contemporary American politics.
In many respects, the current treatment of partisanship and partisan polarization bears
strong resemblance to the Federalists’ treatment of “faction.” Writing in Federalist No. 10 as a
follow-up to the critique of Montesquieu’s concerns about the effects of faction raised by
Hamilton in Federalist No. 9, Madison defined faction as “a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and

13

aggregate interests of the community.” Madison felt that minority factions had the capacity to be
disruptive to the smooth functioning of government, noting that while they “may clog the
administration [and] may convulse the society,” they would be otherwise unable to implement
their goals as they were a minority operating within a majoritarian system. The greater fear for
Madison was the potential harm of a majority faction, which would have the power to put its
policy goals into effect simply because it constituted a majority and could thus trample on the
rights and interests of the minority.8 To put the Federalists into their proper context, their fear of
majority faction centered mainly upon the ability of the unpropertied majority to impose
confiscatory or redistributive policies upon the propertied minority, a theme which still resonates
more than two centuries later (e.g., Boix 2003, among others), but Madison’s description of the
effects of faction in the late 18th century bears striking similarity to the modern day. For this
reason, animosity and antipathy will be used to describe the antagonism and incivility between
the two major parties and their supporters, partisanship will be used to describe ideological or
issue-based divergences arising out of the rhetoric of the parties and political elites, and
polarization will be restricted to issue divergence generally.
1.3

POLARIZATION IS BENEFICIAL
I start from the proposition that all policies are intended as solutions to existing or

potential problems. In and of itself, issue polarization can be beneficial and is necessary in any
political system as difference of opinion leads to the generation and presentation of a set of
policy choices for decision-makers. This is not to assert that it will produce the set of all
solutions, but it should produce something approximating the set of solutions which are possible

8

Madison’s view of faction was in some respects a rejection of Rousseau’s treatment of it in The Social Contract.
Rousseau’s construction of the “General Will” necessarily leads to the conclusion what whatever the majority
decides is right is right. Madison’s approach is more pragmatic and recognizes that being acceptable to the majority
is different from being right.
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within the institutional context of the relevant actors.9 It is perhaps this potential to expand the
set of ideas and solutions that underlies the current appreciation of diversity within some
organizations and institutions. In keeping with this line of reasoning, Teles (2011, 179) argues
that politicians are mostly demanders, not suppliers of ideas. Assuming this to be the case and
merging it with the idea of the constraining effects of the institutional framework described
above10 produces the idea that, barring a radical change in the institutional governing coalition,
the set of ideas and potential solutions produced within an institutional framework could be
charitably characterized as “more of the same.” This comports with Harari’s (2018, 226)
assertion that centers of power are built on existing knowledge and tend to exclude or ignore
information which might tend to disturb or conflict with it. Under these constraints, a new center
could potentially form away from the status quo, but only incrementally deviating from it in a
direction that is acceptable to the existing leadership. In the case of a radical change in
leadership, the set ideas could conceivably be less of the same and deviate farther from the status
quo but should ultimately not be too radical a deviation because the knowledge base of those
upon whom the leadership relies to implement its decisions is also constrained toward the status
quo.11 It is during the formulation stage of the policy-making process that issue divergence can
be most beneficial, but it can be most harmful during the legitimation stage.12 But one must
always keep in mind that the spectrum of choices inexorably reduces to “yea” or “nay” by the

9

If an idea which is applicable to a given situation exists, but that idea is not known to the actors or is otherwise not
seen as existing within the realm of the possible, then it will effectively not exist as a potential solution because it
will not be presented to or taken seriously by the decision-makers.
10 This merger additionally incorporates Skocpol’s (1995, p. 105) understanding of institutions as being “actual
patterns of communication and activity” instead of the more traditional “values, norms, ideas, or official rules.”
While one might logically show Skocpol’s understanding to be a subset of the traditional one, it requires a nuanced
view of what “values, norms, ideas, or official rules” are, so the two have historically been distinguished.
11 This observation should hold regardless of whether the system is authoritarian or democratic; majoritarian or
pluralistic; uni-, bi-, or multipartisan; or any other dimension one might wish to use to distinguish.
12 For a more complete description of the stages of the process, see Brewer and deLeon (1983) and Jones (1984).
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time of the actual decision (Schattschneider 1942), which represents the fewest possible choices
at the greatest possible divergence.
1.4

POLARIZATION ARISES FROM KNOWLEDGE (NORMALLY)
Regarding the base or pool of knowledge available to decision-makers, Harari (2018)

tries to advance a view which tends more strongly to the philosophical than the political, but also
highlights a potential source of the “what is known” problem. Drawing heavily on Sloman and
Fernbach (2017), who are not without their own critics13, Harari proposes that knowledge exists
in two forms: that which we hold on our own and that which is held by others. Modern humans,
in his view and in contrast to earlier societies, hold exceptionally small amounts of knowledge of
the world on their own and are much more reliant upon knowledge held by experts14, producing
the problem of conflating their own knowledge with that held by others. Harari highlights this
problem through the example of an experiment in which respondents were asked to rate their
confidence in their understanding of the functioning of a zipper. This information was then
compared to their ability to accurately describe it, with the result that most failed in the
description while being highly confident of their understanding of how a zipper worked (Harari
2018, 222). The same effect was reported by Sloman and Fernbach (2017) regarding toilets and
bicycles.
Because of the proliferation of information in the modern era and the amount of secondhand (or third- or fourth-hand) knowledge within the pool of available information, people now
have a greater ability to pick and choose the sources of their information instead of being
constrained by more traditional information hierarchies. This ability to engage in confirmation
13

The criticisms of Sloman and Fernbach arise mainly from philosophical epistemology and go to the logical and
semantic structure of their argument rather than its substance.
14 Easterly’s (2014) Tyranny of the Experts is focused upon the problem of economic aid and development in the
poorer nations of the world rather than the nature of knowledge, but his choice of title amply illustrates this
perceived reliance.
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bias, even to the point of willful ignorance, by limiting the sources of information may produce
an “echo chamber” effect where information which radically contradicts the dominant narrative
within a group is excluded such that the group members or adherents receive only information
which agrees with the dominant group narrative (Levendusky 2013). The worst-case result is that
economic policies, foreign policies, environmental policies, and the like are suggested to and
implemented by decision-makers who base their decisions upon information which comports
with their views or the views they wish to advance rather than upon direct examination of the
phenomena they seek to regulate. Thus, decision-makers (and ordinary citizens, for that matter)
can “know” that tax cuts stimulate economic growth, while other citizens can “know” that they
do not, or they may “know” that human activities do or do not affect the climate. This is hardly a
new phenomenon or a new identification of it, but when the cognitive effort to understand the
things that “it depends” depends on exceeds the willingness or capacity to expend that effort, the
impacts of groupthink and external rather than internal knowledge can culminate in the
production of simplistic explanations based upon competing facts regarding any given problem.
The literature on whether education is the solution to this problem is somewhat mixed. For
example, and speaking specifically to the climate change issue, see Braman, et al. (2012) who
find that conformity to in-group biases overrides information which conflicts with those biases
and Guy, et al. (2014) who find that it does not, however see Taber and Lodge (2006) that people
are biased information processors generally.
1.5

POLARIZATION IS NOT INCIVILITY
Having examined what polarization is, a brief examination of what it is not is in order. In

contrast to simple divergence, polarization is not declining civility in political discourse. The
expectation of civility is rooted in social norms, and thus falls within the conception of
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institutions advanced by North (1991, 97) as encompassing “the constraints that structure
political, economic, and social interaction” and that advanced by Skocpol (1995) as being actual
patterns of communication. DiMaggio, et al. (1996) noted that incivility and polarization were
distinguishable as one did not require the presence of the other but allowed that a link between
the two might exist. Thus, incivility goes to the manner in which divergence is expressed, but not
to the underlying divergence. It is possible that polarization and incivility may be mutually
reinforcing, creating a feedback loop such that uncivil discourse leads to higher issue salience in
the news media, which leads to the acceptance of incivility15 and a loosening of the social norms
governing discourse, leading to greater incivility, which leads to higher salience of the incivility,
and so forth. At some point the original issue gets lost in an ad hominem problem where the
messenger is perceived as having become the message. Thus, polarization may cause incivility,
incivility may cause polarization, or the two may be mutually reinforcing, but because a thing
cannot cause itself, the two must be distinguishable.
1.6

POLARIZATION IS NOT SORTING
Care must be exercised in distinguishing polarization from sorting, which is a different

but perhaps related process. Polarization necessarily implies sorting because if the two parties do
not disagree on a given issue, they cannot be distinguished on that issue. Voters can be sorted, as
in knowing which party holds positions closest to or farthest from their own views, without
necessarily holding those exact views themselves. For present purposes, sorting is defined as the
process through which voters identify with the political party which most closely matches their
views and positions. Sorting might include some of the effects of polarization, such as animosity
toward an opposing party or group or acceptance of more extreme issue positions, but it is
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See Morrow (2018) for one case, but the reasoning is extensible.
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distinguishable in that it describes the homogenization of the political parties rather than issue
divergence generally. Duverger’s (1954) seminal work held that political parties in majoritarian
systems would tend to be what are now called “big tents,” encompassing a broad range of
political, ideological, and issue positions.16 When used in conjunction with the classic median
voter theorem’s idea of the need to appeal to the voters in the middle of the political spectrum to
win elections, George Wallace’s observation (quoted in Pearson 1998) of there not being “a
dime’s worth of difference” between the major parties is the logical and inevitable outcome.
Rossiter (1960, 108) more formally observed, “There is and can be no real difference between
the Democrats and Republicans, because the unwritten laws of American politics demand that
the parties overlap substantially in principle, policy, character, appeal, and purpose—or cease to
be parties with any hope of winning a national election.” Those who significantly deviated from
centrality in a general election campaign, such as Barry Goldwater in 1964 or George McGovern
in 1972,17 did so at their peril.
In this conception of sorting, the literature tends to support two propositions which can be
accepted with some degree of confidence. First, causal directionality runs from political elites to
the broader electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Carmines and Stimson 1989,
Levendusky 2009)18. In other words, elites sort first, and the electorate follows, which runs
contrary to the popular conception of parties responding to constituent demands (but see Achen
and Bartels (2016) that many popular conceptions of American political processes are inaccurate,
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Pluralistic systems, by contrast, would tend toward more narrowly constrained positions based in ideology.
Goldwater won a bit more than 38% of the popular vote but won slightly less than 10% of the electoral vote,
carrying only five states of the Deep South and his home state of Arizona, for a total of 52 electoral votes.
McGovern did far worse in that he carried only one state (Massachusetts) and the District of Columbia while gaining
approximately the same share of the popular vote (38%) as Goldwater.
18 Campbell (2018, 53-55) proposes that the electorate had been polarized long before the parties caught up. He
asserts that this lag was due to incumbency advantages, stable partisan identifications, and the lack of a viable
Republican party in the South. The sorting of the parties in the 1980s and 1990s may have revealed an existing
condition, but did not create it.
17
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misleading, or just plain wrong). A second acceptable proposition is that the more politically
active and attentive members of the electorate are better sorted than the rest (Abramowitz 2010
and 2013, Fiorina 2017), which is also in keeping with the first proposition when Bawn, et al.’s
(2012) theory of special interest-driven elites is added.
Wallace’s and Rossiter’s observations regarding the necessity of elite centrality, while
undoubtedly accurate at their time and in their context, are exceptionally suspect in today’s
political environment. Regional party realignments during the Reagan and post-Reagan periods
resulted in a strengthening of the Republican Party at the expense of the Democratic Party in the
South, coupled with a similar strengthening of the Democratic Party in former Republican
strongholds in the northeast and elsewhere (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Carmines and
Stimson 1989, and Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). While one might generally assert that where a
Southern Democrat was conservative 40 years ago, a Southern Republican is conservative
today19, with the result that the two national parties are more ideologically homogeneous than at
any time in the post-WWII era; in other words, Duverger’s big tents have become much smaller
over time.
Fiorina (2017) argues that while this regional realignment of the parties is real, the issue
preferences of the broader electorate are such that the majority of citizens (or at least a plurality
of them, see Abramowitz 2010 and Pew Research Center 2014) are presented with parties and
candidate choices that do not represent their views and are reduced to supporting the one that is
least distasteful (see Weber 2018 for a more thorough discussion of the theoretical underpinnings
of negative voting) or sitting on the sidelines. In Fiorina’s view, voters are presented with
polarized choices rather than being polarized themselves, so expressing a preference for a
19

Or at least more conservative than their Democratic counterpart. If South is controlled for in the previous DWNOMINATE analysis, the Southern Democrat line is more conservative than the Democrat mean from the late
1920s through the present.
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particular party or voting for a less centrist candidate is not indicative of the voter being any less
centrist than previously, but is more indicative of the shrinking of the two parties’ tents, meaning
that the voter must either choose the least uncomfortable tent or be left standing in the rain.
In using “sorting” as a description of political tendencies in the electorate, I do not
include Bishop’s (2008) conception of it as being a phenomenon of individuals intentionally
seeking out and forming communities of the politically like-minded in their decisions of where to
live. Although neighborhoods of the 1950s and 1960s were social centers, they are not such in
the early 21st century. Howard, Gibson, and Stolle (2005) found that almost half (46.2%) of
respondents knew a quarter of their neighbors or less, including 6.3% who knew none, and
almost 85% of respondents reported discussing politics with their neighbors “rarely” (29.1%) or
“never” (54.5%).
1.7

CAUSAL DIRECTIONALITY AMONG THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE
When examining the broader electorate, as previously discussed, the causality arrow for

polarization appears to run from elites to the electorate. Thus, elites sort and polarize, and the
mass public follows. This is not necessarily the case when examining elites as a distinct set of
political actors20. Abramowitz appears to be correct in his assertion that the most politically
active segments of the populace are also the most polarized, but his earlier works do not directly
address causality. His most recent work (Abramowitz 2018) does, but his approach and data
require careful reading and analysis. His basic premise is that extremism leads to activism, which
in turn leads to polarization. In other words, strongly held beliefs about one or more issues lead
to voters becoming more politically active and it is the participation of these extreme voters that
leads to the adverse effects of polarization. This is at odds with some research (e.g. Munson
20

By “elites” I mean not only appointed and elected officeholders at various levels of government, but also party
activists, workers, financial donors (following Carmines and Woods (2002) and Shafer (1998)), and issue activists
(following Bawn, et al. 2012).
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2009) which indicates that it is activism which leads to extremism. This question matters as far
as trying to alleviate the adverse effects of polarization because if the more moderate segments
of the populace become more active in politics (presumably by demanding more moderate
candidates with more moderate policy positions), but activism makes them less moderate, then
the solution not only compounds the problem, but does not comport with some recent
experimental research (Woon 2018) on the Median Voter Theorem (MVT).
1.8

THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM
The MVT mostly arises from the seminal work of Downs (1957) in which voters and

voting may be treated as being similar to consumers and purchasing. Since Downs is an
economist, I initially phrase the description in commercial terms and begin by noting that the
Downsian one-dimensional spatial model in an election scenario assumes an approximately
normal distribution of policy preferences among all potential voters. The median point is not
stationary with respect to the spectrum of all positions and preferences but may be thought of as
a stationary point with respect to the spectrum of possible positions and preferences within a
given frame of reference. For example, full state control of the media is a position which exists
in the complete policy space but is not viewed as possible within the American policy space, so
effectively does not exist as a viable preference within that space.
Under the Downsian median voter framework, commodity producers (parties and
candidates) are strategic and forward-looking. They advertise their products (policies) to
consumers (voters), who are the sole possessors of a resource (votes) which the producers want21
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Downs (1957) proposes the office as the goal for the parties and candidates with the party wishing to accumulate
the largest share of offices and the party’s candidate as the holder of the office. Another way of considering this
situation is to view the policy or the ability to implement policy as the goal and the accumulation of votes as having
value for its utility. I prefer the latter as the ability to implement is necessarily prior to policy, but both approaches
will work for present purposes. Downs’ conception of office-seeking might be attributed to the heterogeneity of the
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and who are also strategic and forward-looking. As there are only two major producers (the
Democratic and Republican parties), the central idea of the theorem is that they must each
compete for the largest share of the consumer base (the electorate). To accumulate the greatest
amount of wealth (political support), parties and candidates try to entice the largest section of the
consumer base whose brand loyalty is not assured into purchasing their product. Because the
purchasing preferences of their brand-conscious customers (solid partisans) are mostly assured,
the focus of their advertising (campaigns) is on the center of the spectrum since the center
represents the smallest distance between all points on the spectrum and those resources are the
ones which could go to their competitor. In this conception, the producers want to “make the
sale” because it “deprives the competition of the sale.” One might consider that negative
campaign advertising is not designed to show how one producer’s product better serves the
customer’s interests, but to show that the competitor’s product (or the competitor itself) is hostile
to those interests.
In more academic terms and assuming a one-dimensional policy space; forward-looking
and strategic (or sincere) voters, candidates, and parties; and policy-oriented motivations, the
MVT proposes that candidates and parties will converge on the policy preferences of the voter at
the median point of the spectrum. This can be applied to both one-stage elections (assume only a
general election) or two-stage elections (primary and general election). Recent work by Woon
(2018) noted that while the MVT predicted convergence on the median voter’s ideal point
regardless of whether candidates and voters were strategic or sincere in their platform and vote
choices, a two-stage election process would tend to produce more ideologically homogeneous
parties because the primary elections would tend to weed out candidates who were either too

parties during the 1950s while the policy-oriented conception may reflect increasing party homogeneity which
allows the parties to behave more monolithically with respect to policy.
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close to or too far from the median primary voter’s ideal point, thus producing median partisan
ideal points which deviate from the broader spectrum’s median. Data from Woon’s experiments
tend to show that primary voters may be recognizing that more extreme candidates could not win
in a general election, but the more centrist stance of the moderate candidate was likely to
produce fewer policy benefits in relation to the status quo. In effect, they split the difference
between the two in their voting. Projecting those findings forward through a series of primary
elections would seem to verify the idea of an incremental movement toward candidate positions
which deviate farther from the median over time, which broadly comports with the polarization
narrative. Woon works well within his set of initial assumptions, but where he fails to satisfy is
in his inability to include other factors, such as the incumbency advantage or the regional
dominance of one party, which would tend to skew the outcomes. Additionally, his experiments
used only two candidates. In primary elections with an incumbent 22 this is not the more common
scenario as incumbents traditionally face uncontested primaries, but in primary elections without
an incumbent, the field of candidates is commonly much larger than two. This is not so much a
flaw in Woon’s theoretical framework as it is more a limitation imposed by the experimental
environment which might be overcome in future work.
In summary, polarization is the divergence of opinions on normative issues of
importance. It is normal and desirable in its benign form, but fractious and harmful in its
malignant form. It is not incivility or antipathy toward those holding opposing opinions, although
the loosening of the norms of political discourse may be a contributing factor, which may in turn
be feeding the underlying divergence. It is elite-driven, or at least elite-shaped, and political
elites are the most polarized segment of the electorate. It is not sorting in the sense of the two
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About half of primaries for House and Senate incumbents were contested in 2018 (approximately 52% for
Republicans and 48% for Democrats), about 45% were contested in 2016, and about 40% were contested in 2014.
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major parties becoming more homogeneous and distinguishable, with voters taking cues from
those distinctions in making their political choices, although a link between the two may exist.
By the same token, when the parties become more homogeneous, they increasingly diverge from
the median voter’s ideal point over time but increasing divergence of the parties only means
increasingly divergent choices for the voter, not that the voters themselves are becoming more
divergent.
To borrow from Key (1966, 7), the “perverse and unorthodox argument” of this work is
not that voters are not fools23, but that the conventional approaches of ideology and issue
divergence are insufficient to explain the accompanying and increasing animosity between
sections of the electorate. In order to account for the current malignant effects of partisan
antipathy or animosity, I propose that it arises from a group identity. Since the conventional
approaches, such as those of Abramowitz, Campbell, and Fiorina, among others, take the
ideological and issue-based paths to polarization, I begin with these in the next chapter.
However, I further propose that partisanship is its own social identity, rather than arising out of
other identities. It does not require the adoption of any underlying ideology and it does not
require the adoption of any definitive set of issue preferences or positions, although prior or
subsequent adoption is not precluded. It only requires a conception of who and what are “not us”
as a basis of the identity and a willingness to see out-group members as united in seeking to harm
in-group interests or to undermine the institutions within which the in-group operates. In its more
extreme forms, out-group members may be perceived as enemies rather than people with whom
one might disagree. Chapter 2 will examine the traditional ideological framework for
polarization and show that it is at best a weak explainer of attitudes and affect between in- and
out-group members. Chapter 3 will examine the partisan framework in a similar fashion and will
23

One need not fool all of the people; only enough to tip the scales in a close election.
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propose that partisan identity is the more parsimonious explainer of attitudes toward members of
the out-group. Chapter 4 will compare and discuss the findings of the two models, explore some
of the normative implications of the findings from the previous chapters, identify unanswered
questions, and propose directions for future research.
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Chapter 2: Ideology and Identity
Who are you?
Who, who, who, who?
-- “Who Are You?” The Who, 1978, lyrics by Pete Townshend
In order to bridge the divisions between Abramowitz, Fiorina, and other polarization
researchers, one must first start from their conceptions of it. Definitions were discussed in the
previous chapter, but those definitions exist within a framework based in an ideological and
issue-based conception of political attitudes. This chapter will examine that framework by
examining the traditional conception of ideology as arising out of the liberal-conservative spatial
model, how it is normally operationalized in public opinion survey instruments, discuss some
perceived flaws in the operationalization and presentation, and test the usefulness of this
conception as an identity (“I am a liberal/conservative” or “She/He is a liberal/conservative”)
which explains attitudes and affect toward those who share that identity and those who do not.
Attitudes are measured using the traditional feeling thermometer questions regarding liberals and
conservatives, with multiple controls for the identity group of the respondent. I propose that the
ideological basis for identity is a weak explainer of these attitudes at best. To the greatest extent
possible, I exclude partisan identities and attitudes from this framework as these will be
examined in Chapter 3.
Following DiMaggio, et al. (1996) and Evans (2003), which carries the DiMaggio
framework forward with additional datapoints and similar findings, the preferred method of
assessing political attitudes has been to link them to an underlying ideology. Since ANES, GSS,
and other large-N national surveys ask respondents to self-place on a liberal-conservative
spectrum, the liberal-conservative dimension has formed the basis of this approach. This is not
without its own set of problems, as will be discussed, but the general method has been to
examine the relationship between issue positions and the respondents’ self-declared ideological
leanings to establish ideology as the basis for polarization. However, the tendency has been to
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move from this to using ideology as a proxy for partisanship, resulting in the conclusion that
liberals (as a proxy for Democrats) and conservatives (as a proxy for Republicans) are polarized.
Recall from the Chapter 1 that polarization is simply divergent opinions on political issues and
antipathy or partisan antipathy describes its noisier manifestations, while partisan sorting occurs
when ideology aligns with party or vice versa.
A relevant, but nuanced point from the work of the DiMaggio group is that polarization
cannot exist without four critical component: (1) the amount of dispersion within groups (to
return to the Duverger (1954) analogy, “how big/small are the tents?”), (2) bimodality (the
distance between the tents), (3) opinion constraint (the extent to which an opinion on one issue is
predictive of opinion on another), and (4) consolidation of opinions along socially significant
lines (who is inside the tents). The first three are important, but not particularly relevant to the
task at hand, while the fourth is the point of greatest interest at present. What is commonly called
polarization, or antipathy to use the more appropriate term, requires an “us vs. them” mentality24,
and “us” must be framed around salient social identities, whether that be male/female,
believer/nonbeliever, class distinctions, race/ethnicity, native/nonnative, or the like. The
conclusion from this line of reasoning is that if the contributors to the liberal-conservative
dimension are socially based, then the liberal-conservative dimension itself must be socially
based. This assumption comports with data collected in the various opinion and attitude surveys.
For example, it does not make much sense to ask about feelings toward “liberals” or
“conservatives” unless they constitute an identifiable in- or out-group. To the extent that most of
our basic theories of political behavior were constructed during the two or three post-war
decades when the two major parties were very heterogenous, liberalism and conservatism were
convenient and perhaps even necessary proxies for these beliefs and attitudes as the tendency
among the two parties has historically been to distinguish on a handful of issues while ignoring
the rest. If the partisan sorting discussed in the previous and next chapters has indeed produced
24

“Them,” or attitudes toward a specific out-group, may also be taken as “not us,” or attitudes toward any who are
not perceived as in-group without necessarily being referential to any specific out-group.
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more ideologically homogeneous parties, then ideological and partisan identities should produce
similar effects and work as approximately equal explainers of the attitudes toward in- and outgroup members.
2.1

LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND IDENTITY
Abramowitz (passim, but Abramowitz and Saunders 2005, 2006, 2008, and Abramowitz

2010 and 2013 particularly) relies heavily on issues and ideology as the basis of polarization.
This is not an especially controversial approach from a theoretical standpoint, though it is subject
to practical objections. To illustrate, I consider the 7-point ideological self-placement question25,
which has been administered in every ANES survey since 1972. When comparing a respondent’s
self-placement on this question to their responses to specific issue preference questions, the
results are often inconsistent, making the self-placement question or the issue preference
questions (or both) unreliable as measures of ideological leanings, so some critiques of this
method of ascribing ideological preference should at least be examined before proceeding.
One line of critique of this ideological approach arises out of Converse ((1964) 2006),
who asserted that the American electorate is too ideologically unsophisticated for “liberal” and
“conservative” to have much meaning. As Converse described it, the variation in issue
preferences when compared to respondents’ self-proclaimed ideological leanings was too
random, so any assumption of a liberal-conservative dimension to the judgements of most of the
electorate was “far-fetched” ((1964) 2006, 17). In support of this criticism, researchers have
traditionally turned to conflicting issue attitudes, levels of political information, open-ended
responses, and other data to demonstrate that the respondents’ beliefs in these areas either do or
do not align with their chosen label. When the preferences significantly deviate from the
expected preferences implied by the label, the normal conclusion is that respondents are too
unsophisticated for such a label to be meaningful. I take a somewhat different approach to
25

The wording varies slightly between surveys and administrations, but the respondent is asked to place themselves
on a 1-7 scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” “Moderate” is usually labeled as the middle
position in most administrations and “or haven’t you thought about it much” is commonly included in the ANES
version of the question.

29

examining the lack of what Converse called “constraint” in the electorate but arrive at much the
same conclusion through an examination of the question of support for or opposition to abortion
as reflected in the General Social Survey (GSS) (Smith, et al., 1972-2016).
The GSS is a survey of political attitudes similar to ANES and has been administered
nationally on at least a bi-annual basis since 197226. I use it in preference to the ANES data
because of the way in which the abortion question was presented to respondents. This issue was
chosen for several reasons, but mostly because (1) it is an issue where attitudes have tended to be
exceptionally persistent27, (2) it is a particularly divisive and long-lived issue, so there are
considerable amounts of data available, and (3) the GSS survey presented the question in a form
where the responses can be cross-checked against each other for consistency. In contrast to the
ANES, which assessed abortion attitudes through a single question, the GSS measured attitudes
toward the issue through a series of questions where the aim was to assess support for or
opposition to abortion in a set of specific circumstances rather than with looser response options
as is done with ANES28. In keeping with the limited vocabulary of Schattschneider’s sovereign,
GSS respondents were only provided with “yes,” “no,” and “don’t know” responses. The specific
circumstances included cases where the pregnancy is “as a result of rape,” if “the woman’s own
health is seriously endangered,” if there is “a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby,” if the
family “cannot afford more children,” if the woman does not want more children, if the woman
does not want to marry the father, and “for any reason.” One would expect that respondents who
supported legal abortion “for any reason” would also support legal abortion in all six subcases,
but the data do not support this. Figure 2.1 (below) shows responses to the “for any reason”
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The administration of GSS in odd-numbered years has been sporadic, but for even-year administrations, 1992 is
the only year for which there is no data and, in contrast to ANES, its codebook notes variations in the order of
question presentation.
27 Achen and Bartels (2006) reported attitudinal stability on abortion at .59 over a 15-year panel study. In
comparison, partisan stability, “the customary gold standard for attitudinal stability” (ibid, 34) was .63.
28 The current (1980 to present) version of the ANES question asks about exceptions for “rape, incest, and when the
woman’s life is in danger” or for a clearly established need in addition to those reasons. Otherwise it is an “always
allowed” or “never allowed” presentation.
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question.29 Comparison of the responses to this question with the other six cases showed that
some respondents who agreed that abortion should not be legal in one or more of the narrower
conditions, agreed that it should be legal in the broader condition. On average, about 16%
changed position in the case of a woman not wanting any more children, 11% changed position
in the case of not being able to afford more children, 10% changed position in the case of not
wanting to marry the father, 2.2% changed position in the case of fetal defects, 1.4% changed
position in the case of rape, and about 1% changed position when the mother’s health was
endangered. Since the “for any reason” condition was consistently presented as the last in this
series of questions (NORC 2017, 466-468), the respondent had already responded “no” to
abortion being allowable under at least one condition before responding that it should be
allowable under any conditions.
Figure 2.1: Support for Abortion “For Any Reason”

With this amount of inconsistency within a salient issue domain and one where
respondents have strongly held beliefs and preferences, the concerns about inconsistency
between a professed and significantly more abstract ideological label and specific issue
preferences are not surprising. And yet, as with the abortion respondents who said “yes” in the
29

The “don’t know” and “no answer” responses were excluded from the chart but accounted for a combined 4.3%
of responses on average.
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“for any reason” case, the liberal-conservative respondent adopts an ideological label, which
must hold some level of meaning for them despite their holding issue positions which conflict
with it. All that the remaining data on issue preferences demonstrate is that the respondent’s
understanding of “liberal” and “conservative” and the researcher’s understanding of the terms are
different, not that the respondent has no understanding of the terms. It was perhaps with this
inconsistency in mind that ANES asked respondents what it meant to be liberal or conservative.
That it was only done once30 may be indicative of the difficulty (or futility) of pursuing that line
of inquiry.
If ideology is based in salient social group identity as the DiMaggio group assumes, but
the self-identifying group member does not hold preferences which comport with the
overarching identity, then the self-placement must be based in some other characteristic. A
possible suspect is that the respondent places themselves relative to one or more notable inand/or out-group figures rather than issue preference. In this case, the ideological label is
proxying for the like/dislike of that figure rather than specific issue preferences. A useful test of
this approach to the meaning of the response might be to present the respondent with a list of
notable figures whose issue preferences are known and measurable, ask if they are familiar with
that person, and then ask if the respondent thinks they are higher/lower or about the same on the
scale as that person. The resulting data might be more indicative of the respondent’s perception
of others than an accurate self-assessment, but it would perhaps be less “fuzzy” than the present
data. Worth noting is that Pew Research sometimes takes something like this approach in its
surveys. Most respondents in a recent publication (Pew 2018), when presented with a 0 (liberal)
to 10 (conservative) scale tend to place themselves between positions 3 and 7, effectively
“moderate” or slightly to the left or right of it. Democrats, on average, placed the Democratic
Party at 3.9, while Republicans placed it at 1.5, on average, with 55% of Republicans placing it
at 0. Republicans, on average, placed the Republican Party at 7.1, while Democrats placed it at
30

In 1992, respondents were presented with two open-ended questions: “What does it mean to say that someone’s
views are [liberal/conservative]?”
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7.4, on average, with 33% of Democrats placing it at 10. Some take-ways from this data are that
people often tend to see others as holding more extreme positions than they actually do, although
it is interesting to note that Republicans’ view of the liberalism of the Democratic Party is
significantly more extreme than Democrats’ view of the Republican Party’s conservatism.
A second line of critique arises out of the idea that terms like “liberal” or “conservative”
are essentially symbolic representations rather than an aggregation of beliefs. This line of
thinking seems to go back to the ideas of post-modernists such as Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and others, who maintained that most things (words, concepts,
social practices, art, etc.) reflect a relationship between symbols rather than a relationship
between symbols and real things31, to the extent that our entire understanding of the world is
mediated by such symbols. But, like the first line of critique, this one inevitably arrives at the
same conclusion that understandings of “liberal” and “conservative” as symbolic representations
are different rather than the symbols having no meaning for the person who uses them.
A third line of critique arises from the variation of responses within categories. Campbell
(2018) examined Ellis and Stimson’s (2012) modified version of Free and Cantril’s (1967)
concept of “operational ideology.” Under this conception, a self-identified conservative, for
example, who supported more funding for education, social safety nets, urban renewal programs,
or the like was not behaving in line with the adopted label and one might wonder whether the
respondent was more attached to the label than the underlying ideology.32 The reality is likely
simpler than the critique would have one believe. If a respondent finds that “on the whole” or
“more often than not” they hold conservative positions on a range of issues, then they might feel
justified in asserting that they are conservative under the assumption that ideology is a dimmer
switch rather than a binary condition. By the same reasoning, a respondent might also be
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This idea in the modern era arguably arises out of Charles Saunders Peirce’s categories of “firstness,”
“secondness,” and “thirdness” (Peirce 1868), although the idea of reality being mediated by symbols can be traced
back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle.
32 This line of reasoning perhaps was the basis for many staunch Republican commentators, beginning sometime in
the 1990s, to refer to their more centrist party members as RINOs (Republican in Name Only).
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indicating that they do not identify with the opposite label more than they identify with the
chosen label. At its core, though, the self-identification question itself is a binary condition
(liberal or conservative) and is frequently operationalized as such. If, for example, a respondent
believes that the harmful effects of extreme poverty might be more effectively addressed by
alleviating its causes rather than addressing its effects, then they have effectively decided that
one proposed solution is more palatable than the other, even though both are aimed at dealing
with something most would agree is a problem. The difference is that one solution is not
perceived as being as conservative or as liberal as the other.
This returns to the idea broached in the previous chapter that “liberal” and
“conservative,” like “fast” and “slow,” are relative rather than absolute terms, but researchers
who have been focused on the perceived inconsistency between the respondents’ adopted label
and their issue preferences have generally treated them as absolutes. Ellis and Stimson (2012),
for example, concluded that nearly two-thirds of self-identified conservatives favored spending
policies that were more in line with liberal positions than conservative ones, and viewed these
respondents as being conflicted conservatives or liberals with a conservative veneer, seemingly
more attached to the label than the underlying ideology. The idea that nearly two-thirds of
conservative respondents appear to have no idea of what being conservative means is very bold
claim and because it is one made by very well-respected researchers who rigorously ground that
claim in their data, it should be given serious consideration.
To examine this question (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below), I use two indicators of spending
(the methodology for the construction of these may be found in Appendix A): social spending
(aid to the poor, aid to the homeless, federal student aid, foreign aid, social security, etc.) and
what might be broadly thought of as spending for “public goods” in the form of spending for
defense, crime, and schools. Each has received its share of support and criticism with respect to
impacts on federal budgets from candidates and commentators on both sides of the spectrum, so
all are salient to some degree. I use a simple additive index of the issue responses, coding each
issue as -1 for preferences that spending in that area be increased, 1 for preferences that spending
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be decreased, and 0 for preferences that spending be kept “about the same.” Respondents who
did not express a preference or were not asked a question were treated as missing datapoints.
While the number of spending issues reported in the CDF has varied from administration to
administration, it is not the specific issue that is being examined, but the issue of spending in
general. For the final indicator, negative numbers may be understood as signifying that
respondents prefer increases in social spending “on the whole” while positive numbers would
indicate preferences for reductions in social spending “on the whole.” The amount of increase or
decrease preferred is not explored. Non-Ideologues include respondents who responded to the
self-placement question with “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” and any
respondent who was unable to identify the Republican Party as being the more conservative
party at the national level. Because the self-placement question was not asked prior to 1972,
spending preference questions in earlier administrations are not used.
Table 2.1: Ideology and Preferences for Federal Social Spending
Self-Reported Ideology

Preferred Change in Spending (% of Respondents)
Increase
Same
Decrease
Total*
69.0%
12.6%
7.9%
89.5%
53.0%
16.4%
16.8%
86.2%
30.8%
18.1%
39.2%
88.1%
62.2%
11.4%
8.9%
82.5%
63.4%
16.3%
20.3%
100.0%

Liberal (17.4%)
Moderate (14.7%)
Conservative (24.6%)
Non-Ideologue (43.3%)
Total (100.0%)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* totals do not sum to 100 because “don’t know” respondents on individual spending questions
were treated as “missing”
For “public goods” spending, I use preferences for spending on defense, federal spending
on crime, and preferences for spending on public schools. Defense spending was presented on a
1 to 7 scale, so was recoded with -1 favoring decreased spending, 1 favoring increased spending,
and 0 (4 on the scale of the response set) being taken as “about the same.” Spending on crime
and public schools were presented as 3-point scales and were treated the same as the social
spending questions.
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Table 2.2: Ideology and Preferences for Federal Spending on Public Goods
Self-Reported Ideology

Preferred Change in Spending (% of Respondents)
Increase
Same
Decrease
Total*
54.5%
25.1%
10.0%
89.6%
61.3%
17.7%
11.8%
90.8%
59.6%
18.2%
10.3%
88.1%
60.8%
15.6%
5.7%
82.1%
69.5%
21.4%
9.1%
100.0%

Liberal (17.4%)
Moderate (14.7%)
Conservative (24.6%)
Non-Ideologue (43.3%)
Total (100.0%)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* totals do not sum to 100 because “don’t know” respondents on individual spending questions
were treated as “missing”
This data tends to somewhat support Ellis and Stimson’s (2012) thesis, but it is worth
noting that with regard to social spending, only about 30% of Conservatives expressed
preferences in favor of increasing it and close to 40% favored decreasing it, while Liberals and
Moderates appear to be overwhelmingly in favor of not decreasing social spending. It is also
worth noting that self-identified conservatives had the largest number of missing datapoints
attributable to “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” responses. I do not approach
these types of responses as being functionally equivalent to “no preference” and treat them as
missing instead. Across all ideological categories, respondents appear to be overwhelmingly in
favor of maintaining or increasing spending on services which could be classified as “public
goods,” a stance somewhat at odds with the general depiction of liberals being “dovish” or “antiestablishment.” Ideological leanings do show significant marginal effects on spending
preferences for social spending (coef. 0.65, p<0.001) and have a little explanatory power
(r2=0.20), but this is not the case for public goods spending (coef. -0.06, p<0.001), where their
explanatory power is almost nonexistent (r2=0.005). Although this is not an exceptionally
rigorous examination of the utility of liberal or conservative leanings as an indicator of spending
preferences, the assumption of spending per se as a proxy for ideological leaning should be
approached cautiously as the question of spending “for what” seems to be much more important
and salient than spending in general.
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To continue the earlier point of “liberal” and “conservative” being relative rather than
absolute labels and proposing that it would be more efficacious to treat them as such, the
question of “relative to what?” remains unanswered and may be unanswerable. An issue
preference may be more liberal than or more conservative than some other preference on that
issue, but absent a generally accepted standard of what “liberal,” “conservative,” or even
“centrist” mean, their use as an ideological measure lacks operationalizability. The idea of the
partisan “big tents” that arose out of Duverger (1954) are equally applicable to ideology,
especially in the American context. Thus, liberalism and conservatism can encompass a wide
range of issue positions that allow the respondent to have their own conception of where they sit
on that spectrum while still being liberal or conservative in comparison to something else.
Whether it can form the basis of an identity remains to be seen.
A second but related criticism of looking for ideological consistency through the use of
the liberal/conservative labels arises out of an assumption that may or may not be well-founded.
If the two are relative positions as I have argued, is the depiction of an uninformed electorate
sufficient to discount the ability of the respondent to base their self-identification on a
comparison to some other reference point? Political attitudes in the United States do not exist in
a vacuum and unaffected by externals. As an example, if someone were sufficiently liberal by
domestic standards to support most of the Democratic Party’s national platform, they would
likely feel comfortable within the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party, but probably be
somewhat to the right of it on many issues, immigration being a notable exception.33 Not being
informed on national or international news, for example, does not mean that one is not exposed
to ideological cues through other means. Conservative elite rhetoric regarding some proposal
being socialist or Marxist-Leninist might serve to excite some portion of that base of voters who
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In 2000, the Democratic Party’s stance on immigration was approximately in line with the Republican Party’s
position of enforcement of existing immigration laws with the addition of keeping undocumented migrants from
being exploited by employers. In 2004, it began pushing for a path to citizenship for undocumented migrants. This
stance would be decidedly contrary to the Conservative Party’s current immigration plank.

37

see themselves as vehemently opposed to anything so labeled34, but an American liberal may not
see the proposal as being far enough left to rise to that level. For example, the United States is
the only country in top 50, based on the Human Development Index (HDI), that does not provide
for universal health care, at least on paper. Thus, when considering the liberalism or
conservatism of a universal health care proposal within a purely domestic information
environment, it would indeed be on the liberal side of the domestic spectrum, but it may be
centrist or conservative when viewed within an international context. One should additionally
keep in mind that while Sean Hannity can reasonably expect about 3 million viewers per week
and Rachel Maddow attracts about 2.7 million, Downton Abbey attracted more than double their
combined viewership. Without being able to control for those extraneous cues, the
“liberal/conservative in comparison to what” problem further erodes of the utility of the selfplacement response as an indicator for establishing polarization.
A last line of critique of the ideology and issue position approach to polarization through
the “liberal” and “conservative” labels is that if the partisan sorting observations discussed in the
previous chapter are at work, the issue position responses may currently provide a better
indicator of partisan leanings than of ideological ones. The partisan line of inquiry will be
addressed in Chapter 3, but assuming this to be the case, ideological self-placement may be
working as a partial or full proxy for partisanship, which is not necessarily in keeping with the
idea of ideology as identity, but it is in keeping with Abramowitz’ and Campbell’s treatment of
it. To this extent, how the self-placement indicator is used becomes a critical piece of the identity
puzzle.
The common practice for index indicators such as self-placement is to collapse the larger
scale (7-point scale in the case of ideology) to something smaller, typically 3-point (liberalmoderate-conservative) or 5-point (liberal-moderate-conservative and something resembling
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For the other side of the argument, Godwin’s Law (Godwin 1994) holds that as the length of any internet
discussion increases, the probability of comparisons to Nazis or Hitler entering the discussion approaches 1, thus
rendering much liberal rhetoric as susceptible to inflammatory labeling as its conservative counterparts.
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“leaner”). A problem with this practice in that it creates an assumption of a binary condition
(liberal/conservative and the rest don’t really count) or the conflation of two or more categories
so the dimmer-switch construction of the response set does not work as intended. Another issue
is that the spatial model is one-dimensional, and the liberal/conservative question assumes this
dimensionality. Unless a position is at one of the polar extremes35, any point on that spectrum
will always be “more conservative than” or “less conservative than” some other point, while
simultaneously being “more liberal than” or “less liberal than” the same point. Absent an agreedupon measure of where positions belong on the spectrum (the meaning ascribed to selfplacement is ultimately relative to the researcher’s understanding of the spectrum), charges of
respondent inconsistency can be tossed about with impunity.
Figures 2.2 through 2.9 show the percentage of each response category on the 7-point
self-placement scale in each ANES and GSS administration since 197236. In order to keep the
pre-1984 ANES respondents in line with those from 1984 and later and to be consistent with the
GSS question, I do not make use of the ANES follow-up question37. Like the follow-up question
for partisanship self-placement, the follow-up on the liberal-conservative dimension appears to
assume that the “moderate” respondent or the respondent who “doesn’t know” or “hasn’t thought
much about it” has an internal label that they are hiding from the researcher. This is a case where
the respondent should be allowed to speak for themselves rather than being pigeon-holed by the
survey question.
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See Rossiter (1955) for the idea that the linear spectrum might be better viewed as circular.
The first GSS survey with this question was administered in 1974 and the NA responses were excluded for all
administrations of both surveys.
37 “If you had to choose, would you consider yourself a liberal or a conservative?”
36
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Figure 2.2: Extremely Liberal Self-Placement

Figure 2.3 Extremely Conservative SelfPlacement

Figure 2.4 Liberal Self-Placement

Figure 2.5 Conservative Self-Placement

Figure 2.6 Slightly Liberal Self-Placement

Figure 2.7 Slightly Conservative SelfPlacement
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Figure 2.8 Moderate Self-Placement

Figure 2.9 DK/Ref Self Placement

Three things are immediately noticeable on these charts. First, the line for the percentage
of respondents who “didn’t know” or refused to answer is significantly lower and much
smoother in the GSS data. This may be due to the ANES respondent being offered a “haven’t
thought much about it” option that the GSS respondent was not offered. Second, the lines for the
respondents who identify as “extremely” liberal or conservative appear to be rising sharply while
those for the respondents who identify as “slightly” liberal or conservative appear to be
declining, although at a lower rate. This is mostly due to the scale of the charts as both sets
represent about a 2%-3% change in those response categories. Third, there is a noticeable
difference between the two surveys across all response categories except “slightly conservative”
and “conservative.” While the lines for all categories generally go in the same directions at
approximately the same times38, there is an obvious difference which might be more attributable
to who is being asked rather than what is being asked. On average, however, the percentage of
respondents in each category for each of the surveys is approximately consistent, as shown in
Table 2.3 below, with the difference in the “Moderate” category being perhaps mostly
explainable in terms of the “haven’t thought much about it” option offered to ANES respondents.

38

ANES became a quadrennial survey in 2004, while GSS remained biannual, so there are no ANES datapoints for
the 2006, 2010, 2012, and 2014 midterm administrations.
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Table 2.3: Average Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement (1972-2016)
Category
GSS
2.79
Extremely Liberal
11.02
Liberal
12.17
Slightly Liberal
36.92
Moderate
15.14
Slightly Conservative
14.28
Conservative
3.18
Extremely Conservative
DK/Ref
4.50
Source: GSS, 1972-2016, and ANES CDF, 1948-2016
2.2

ANES
1.85
8.15
9.39
24.82
13.84
14.29
2.56
25.10

TESTING IDEOLOGY AS IDENTITY
To test the ideology-as-identity approach and the ideological polarization narrative, I first

check that ideological labels exist and are meaningful to the respondent. These are testable
assumptions as the respondent’s ability to self-place on the liberal-conservative dimension
validates the existence of the labels and that “liberal” and “conservative” are terms within the
respondent’s functional vocabulary. The meaningfulness of the labels can be at least minimally
tested by identifying the Republican Party as being the more conservative party at the national
level. This indicator is basically RePass’ (2008) PTR indicator39, minus the feeling thermometer
responses. Since I use the CDF, I immediately exclude all cases prior to 1972 and do not employ
the follow-up question. I remove all cases where the post-election portion of the survey was not
done because respondents who only completed the pre-election wave would have missing data
for other variables as ANES is flexible in the presentation of each wave’s questions. I also
remove all respondents who were not asked this question40 to avoid including their responses to
other questions. One of RePass’ coding decisions was that the DK/Ref/NA respondents should
not be included with the moderates. I agree with and continue that reasoning by merely recoding

39

RePass’ findings, based in the 2004 ANES data, broadly comport with those of Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
((2004) 2011), but a detailed analysis of them is outside the scope of the present work.
40 This decision is problematic only for the 2000 administration where removal of the NA respondents leaves a
sample size of 736. For the other administrations, the number of NA respondents is a couple of dozen or less.
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them as “non-ideological” since they expressed no ideological leanings. This produces the
distributions in Table 2.4 below.
Table 2.4: Ideological Self-Placement Distributions (Percent) 1972-2016
Year

1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2008
2012
2016

Extreme
Liberal

Liberal

Slight
Liberal

Moderate

Slight
Conserv.

Conserv.

Extreme
Conserv.

NonIdeo.

Total

1.5

7.2

9.8

26.9

14.9

10.2

1.3

28.2

100.0%

2,155

1.5

9.9

7.9

28.0

13.3

11.9

1.6

25.9

100.0%

1,550

1.4

6.7

8.4

25.4

13.3

12.0

2.4

30.5

100.0%

1,893

1.7

7.8

9.9

26.8

13.5

11.3

2.3

26.8

100.0%

2,284

1.6

6.2

8.9

19.5

13.8

13.3

2.1

34.7

100.0%

1,362

1.4

5.8

7.5

22.4

12.7

12.1

2.2

35.9

100.0%

1,400

1.5

7.3

9.5

23.3

14.4

13.6

1.7

28.6

100.0%

1,971

1.1

6.0

10.7

27.8

15.2

13.0

1.5

24.7

100.0%

2,170

1.8

5.7

9.7

21.8

15.9

13.9

2.8

28.5

100.0%

1,771

1.4

7.2

8.1

24.5

13.9

9.8

2.1

33.0

100.0%

1,967

2.0

8.5

9.9

23.3

15.2

12.7

2.2

26.2

100.0%

2,250

1.4

6.4

7.8

26.8

14.7

18.2

3.1

21.5

100.0%

1,784

1.3

7.9

10.5

23.6

15.8

17.0

2.3

21.5

100.0%

1,532

2.3

7.1

9.9

29.0

15.7

12.9

2.6

20.5

100.0%

1,280

1.9

8.3

11.0

24.5

13.6

16.0

3.4

21.3

100.0%

736

1.5

11.8

9.1

22.2

12.4

21.9

4.6

16.3

100.0%

1,335

2.3

9.0

8.6

24.3

12.6

17.6

2.9

22.6

100.0%

1,065

3.0

10.2

8.1

22.3

10.3

13.4

3.4

29.2

100.0%

2,098

3.3

11.0

11.0

31.0

13.5

16.9

3.5

9.8

100.0%

5,480

3.0

13.0

11.3

23.1

12.1

17.9

3.2

16.2

100.0%

3,639

N

Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
Respondents who had missing data for which party was more conservative at the national
level were removed from the dataset. This considerably shrinks the number of administrations
available for use as the question has been inconsistently included since its introduction in 1960.
As an added complication, a coding of zero for the remaining respondents has one of several
meanings. For some respondents it means they did not provide a response (equivalent to
“refused” in other ANES questions). This case is not a major concern because no answer is an
answer for present purposes. For other respondents, it means that they were not asked the
question. In 1972, 1,051 respondents were surveyed with a form that did not contain the
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question, so they were dropped from the dataset. For 1984, 999 respondents completed the
relevant wave via telephone interview and this question was not asked, so they were dropped
from the dataset. For 1990, 994 respondents were surveyed with a form that did not include the
question, so they were dropped from the dataset. Of the remaining respondents, those who could
not identify the Republican Party as the more conservative party41 had their self-placement
response recoded as “Non-Ideologue” because the possession a meaningful understanding of
“conservative” is not assumable without being able to identify the largest group which publicly
and vehemently identifies as conservative. The inclusion of “at the national level” in the question
framing is intended to eliminate confusion which might be attributable to regional or local party
variations. The resulting dataset’s distributions are shown in Table 2.5 below.

Table 2.5: Ideological Self-Placement Distributions (Percent) with Republicans
as the More Conservative Party, 1972-2016
Year

Extreme
Liberal

Liberal

Slight
Liberal

Moderate

Slight
Conserv.

Conserv.

Extreme
Conserv.

NonIdeo.

Total

N

1972

1.4

5.3

6.4

14.3

11.9

7.2

1.0

52.4

100.0

1,104

1976

0.9

5.5

6.1

14.3

9.8

9.5

1.6

52.3

100.0

1,893

1984

0.3

5.0

5.6

10.9

10.9

11.8

0.8

54.6

100.0

972

1988

1.1

4.1

6.5

12.6

10.6

10.8

2.3

51.9

100.0

1,771

1990

0.6

5.7

4.3

11.6

9.1

6.2

0.9

61.6

100.0

973

1992

1.2

7.1

6.9

13.8

10.5

9.3

1.2

49.9

100.0

2,250

2004

2.2

7.7

6.1

16.2

10.2

15.2

2.3

40.0

100.0

1,065

2008

2.0

8.5

5.8

12.2

6.9

10.7

2.1

51.7

100.0

2,098

2012

2.6

9.5

9.1

18.0

10.6

14.4

2.8

33.0

100.0

5,480

2016

2.9

11.8

9.4

14.2

10.4

16.6

3.0

31.6

100.0

3,639

Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
The results of this construction show that Abramowitz is partially correct in his assertion
of a growing divide between liberals and conservatives as evidenced by the generally upward
trends among both the Liberal and Conservative identifiers. However, in contrast to his general
41

These would include respondents who did not know if one party was more conservative, thought there was no
difference between the parties, knew that one was more conservative but not which one, or identified the Democrats
as the more conservative party.
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assertion in The Disappearing Center (2010), the percentage of moderate/middle-of-the-road
respondents remains relatively consistent. What seems to be shrinking and disappearing are the
non-ideological respondents, predominantly those who respond with “don’t know” or “haven’t
thought much about it” to any of the component questions. Whether or not this is indicative of a
growing level of information in the electorate is not as clear, but it could also be explainable in
terms of the two parties becoming more ideologically homogeneous and ideology partially
proxying for partisanship.
Both the “liberal vs. conservative” and “Democrat vs. Republican” versions of the
polarization narrative are reminiscent of Mary Boykin Chesnut’s (1905, 20) observation of the
Civil War that “[North and South] are divorced because we have hated each other so.” The
interesting part of that observation is that there must be an identifiable object toward which the
ill feelings can be directed for it to work. Extending Chesnut’s observation to the present, one
might expect that people with similar ideological identifications would be perceived as in-group,
people with opposing ideological views would be perceived as out-group, and the ideological
difference would drive the attitudes toward both the in- and out-group members. Liberals and
conservatives, therefore, should have positive feelings toward their own group and less positive
or negative feelings toward the other. To test this, I use the feeling thermometer questions for
liberals and conservatives, excluding non-ideologues and DK/Ref/NA responses, but noting that
having any level of feeling toward either group is indicative of the existence of that group as an
identifiable object in the respondent’s mind. If the data show this, then we should accept the
proposition that ideology can be and is functioning as a form of social identity. Tables 2.6A,
2.6B, and Tables 2.7A, and 2.7B, below, show the results of a series of bivariate regressions
using the two Feeling Thermometers as the dependent variable and self-placement as the
independent variable while limiting the year of administration to view change over time.
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Table 2.6A: Effect of Liberal Self-Placement (SP) on Feeling Thermometer (FT)
Placement (non-ideologues excluded)
DV

IV

Year Corr.
All
-0.65
All
-0.35
1972 -0.23
1976 -0.24
1984 -0.32
1988 -0.29
1990 -0.36
1992 -0.38
2004 -0.25
2008 -0.26
2012 -0.39
2016 -0.40

SP (N=12,037)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=3,652)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=141)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=234)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=103)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=203)
Liberals FT
Liberal (SP<4) (N=103)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=342)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=166)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=332)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=1,155)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=973)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Coef.
-11.05***
-9.19***
-5.15**
-6.24***
-9.87**
-8.12***
-9.87***
-9.07***
-6.91**
-6.78***
-10.07***
-9.79***

SE
0.12
0.40
1.88
1.64
2.96
1.92
2.56
1.21
2.06
1.38
0.69
0.77

R2
0.43
0.13
0.05
0.06
0.10
0.08
0.13
0.14
0.06
0.07
0.16
0.16

Table 2.6B: Effect of Liberal Self-Placement (SP) on Feeling Thermometer (FT)
Placement (non-ideologues excluded)
DV

IV
SP (N=12,037)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=140)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=233)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=103)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=203)
Conservatives
Liberal (SP<4) (N=102)
FT
Liberal (SP<4) (N=341)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=167)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=332)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=1,157)
Liberal (SP<4) (N=874)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Year
All
1972
1976
1984
1988
1990
1992
2004
2008
2012
2016

Corr.
0.62
0.35
0.17
0.12
0.17
0.22
0.25
0.13
0.19
0.23
0.32

Coef.
9.73***
9.62***
3.31
3.93
5.27*
8.07*
6.70***
4.10
5.57***
6.92***
10.55***

SE
0.11
2.21
1.86
3.17
2.17
3.65
1.43
2.37
1.56
0.86
1.05

R2
0.39
0.12
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.10

Regarding liberals as an identifiable group, the idea that they view other liberals as ingroup and conservatives as out-group is an acceptable proposition based on the data as the
correlations and marginal effects all point to this conclusion. That they view other liberals more
favorably than they view conservatives is also an acceptable proposition as the strength of liberal
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self-placement is consistently significant and increases the liberal feeling thermometer rating by
between five and ten degrees in all administrations without an equal change in the conservative
feeling thermometer, but noting that “slight liberals” tend to express cooler feelings toward
“liberals” than their more solidly ideological counterparts. That liberals show an increasing
tendency to view conservatives unfavorably does seem supportable, but noting that in three of
the ten administrations, this effect is weak and insignificant. It is a strong effect only in recent
years and in 1972. For other years, it seems more prudent to propose that while they show
greater warmth for the in-group, the out-group appears to receive some benefit of the doubt,
although not as much as the in-group. What does not appear to be an acceptable proposition is
that any of this is driven by ideological identity as the basis of the behavior. While the results
regarding liberal self-placement on the liberal feeling thermometer rating are consistently
significant, the explanatory power of this model is too low to be afforded much weight and the
number of insignificant effects of liberal self-placement on the conservative feeling thermometer
rating further detracts from it.

Table 2.7A: Effect of Conservative Self-Placement (SP) on Feeling Thermometer (FT)
Placement (non-ideologues excluded)
DV

IV
SP (N=12,037)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=5,175)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=217)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=380)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=224)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=415)
Liberals FT
Conservative (SP>4) (N=156)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=470)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=292)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=410)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=1,525)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=1,086)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Year Corr.
All
-0.65
All
-0.34
1972 -0.21
1976 -0.27
1984 -0.31
1988 -0.33
1990 -0.45
1992 -0.38
2004 -0.37
2008 -0.26
2012 -0.36
2016 -0.35

Coef.
-11.05***
-12.26***
-6.68**
-8.56***
-11.21***
-9.84***
-16.98***
-13.24***
-12.60***
-8.80***
-12.86***
-11.91***

SE
0.12
0.47
2.15
1.54
2.33
1.38
2.73
1.47
1.85
1.63
0.87
0.96

R2
0.43
0.12
0.04
0.08
0.09
0.11
0.20
0.15
0.14
0.07
0.13
0.12

Table 2.7B: Effect of Conservative Self-Placement (SP) on Feeling Thermometer (FT)
Placement (non-ideologues excluded)
DV

IV

SP (N=11,907)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=5,191)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=219)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=388)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=226)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=415)
Conservatives FT
Conservative (SP>4) (N=153)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=472)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=295)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=411)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=1,524)
Conservative (SP>4) (N=1,088)
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Year Corr.
Coef.
SE
R2
All -0.64 9.87*** 0.11 0.41
All -0.38 10.53*** 0.36 0.14
1972 0.11
2.64
1.68 0.01
1976 0.22 5.76*** 1.29 0.05
1984 0.29 7.06*** 1.58 0.08
1988 0.27 6.82*** 1.22 0.07
1990 0.25
6.90** 2.23 0.06
1992 0.40 11.12*** 1.18 0.16
2004 0.37 10.36*** 1.50 0.14
2008 0.33 9.08*** 1.27 0.11
2012 0.42 12.64*** 0.71 0.17
2016 0.48 13.24*** 0.73 0.23

The picture presented by the data for conservatives is substantially different from that of
liberals. First, the propositions that conservatives see conservatives as an identifiable in-group
and liberals as an identifiable out-group are sound. That they view other conservatives favorably
is also supported by the data. Unlike liberals, however, conservatives assign substantially greater
disfavor to the out group than the favor they assign to the in-group, though this effect may be
tapering off somewhat in the more recent survey data. But where liberals may have been willing
to give some benefit of the doubt to the out-group, conservatives have not. Even in the years
where the amount of disfavor appears to be falling, it is matched by greater favor afforded to the
in-group, especially among the more solidly ideological identifiers. The explanatory power of
this model seems to work better for conservatives than for liberals, but it remains on the weak
side. It is interesting to note that, like their “slight liberal” counterparts, “slight conservative”
respondents seem to be more critical of other conservatives, with conservative thermometer
ratings of 50 or less being fairly common, especially in the 1984-1992 administrations. To this
extent, the “slight” ideologues are exhibiting attitudes which might be expected from moderates
or anti-ideologues.
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The data for the “moderate” self-placers is mostly within expectations. With regard to
Liberals, the mean placement for each administration generally stays within the 54-56 range with
the lowest mean placement at 51.6 in 2012 and the highest at 60.1 in 1984, noting that the mean
placements in 2004 and 2008 were fractionally over 59. For Conservatives, the data from the
earlier administrations (1972-1990) shows that self-placed moderates viewed them between five
and ten degrees more favorably than they did liberals, but for the later administrations (2012 and
2016, especially) conservatives are given a much cooler reception, even averaging a slightly subneutral 48 in 2012. This raises questions of the degree to which ideology is proxying for
partisanship as the cooler ratings would seem to be more likely due to perceptions of Republican
elites and supporters than to ideological shifts. But this is the question to which I shall turn in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Partisanship and Identity
The times they are a-changin’
--Bob Dylan, 1964.
Using partisan identification as the basis of polarization seems a much simpler and
straightforward construct than using the more abstract and fuzzier liberal-conservative
identification. Among other differences, it should not suffer from the “in comparison to what”
problem as a Democrat is a Democrat and a Republican is a Republican. The problem of
international cues, as discussed in Chapter 2, almost completely disappears as the two parties are
quite solidly grounded in the institutions and politics of the United States, although this does not
preclude international cues playing some role in the construction of the parties’ agendas. Unlike
liberal and conservative, there are formal methods of determining what the two parties stand for,
although both continue to produce platforms that tend to be phoenix-like in nature42.
Consequently, one should expect greater consistency when it comes to respondent policy
preferences being in line with the larger identity. Also, unlike the liberal-conservative
identification, it is significantly easier to identify both the in- and out-groups in a partisan context
than in an ideological one. Bumper stickers, yard signs, billboards, mass media ads, and so forth
all give clear cues as to who is “us” and who is “them” (or at least “not us”), perhaps more so in
campaigns which are more candidate-centered, and the news media is very good about
associating newsworthy people and events with the appropriate party on a daily, and often hourly
basis.
Consider, for example, the recent Senate confirmation hearings on the nomination of
Brett Kavanaugh to fill the seat of retiring Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kenney. In an
Economist/YouGov poll of 1,500 US adults conducted between September 30 and October 2,

42

Every four years they rise from the ashes of the previous platform, blaze brilliantly, and then substantively,
rhetorically, and symbolically fade into obscurity until the next national convention.
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2018 (The Economist/YouGov 2018b), 74% of self-identified Democrat respondents43 had an
unfavorable (“somewhat” or “very”) opinion of Kavanaugh while 70% of self-identified
Republican respondents had a favorable (“somewhat” or “very”) opinion of him44. As a baseline
for comparison, in Economist/YouGov (2018a) data for July 15-17 (Kavanaugh’s nomination
was announced on July 10), 50% of Democrats had an unfavorable opinion of him (22%
“somewhat” and 28% “very”) with 35% unsure, while 64% of Republicans had a favorable
opinion of him (26% “somewhat” and 38% “very”) with 27% unsure. These results were based
on a sample of 1500 US adults in which 22% of Democrats and 16% of Republicans had heard
“nothing at all” about him, 36% of Democrats and 43% of Republicans had heard “a little,”
while 42% of Democrats and 41% of Republicans had heard “a lot” about him. Favorability
among Independents was split with 29% favorable (13% “somewhat” and 16% “very”), 22%
unfavorable (9% “somewhat” and 13% “very”), and 49% unsure, with 38% having heard “a lot”
about him, 31% heard “a little,” and 32% having heard “nothing at all.” Regarding the
allegations of sexual misconduct which became one of the major points of the confirmation
hearings, 74% of self-identified Democrat respondents believed Kavanaugh was not being
truthful (either “probably” or “definitely”) about the alleged misbehavior, while 76% of selfidentified Republican respondents believed he was being truthful (about 15% of both groups
were not sure). 80% of Democrat respondents believed Kavanaugh should not be confirmed,
77% of Republican respondents thought he should, and Independent respondents were
approximately evenly divided/unsure45. Under the assumption of partisanship as identity, the
simpler and more likely explanation encompassing the larger share of the variation in those
preferences is that Kavanaugh represented the “out-group” among Democrats and “in-group”
among Republicans.

43

About 35% of respondents self-identified as Democrat, about 41% as Independent, and about 24% as Republican.
YouGov does not detail how “leaners” are classified, but other Economist/YouGov survey results appear to allow
respondents to “lean” toward one party or the other but to ultimately leave them classified as Independents.
44 Independents were split with 38% unfavorable, 28% favorable, and 35% unsure.
45 29% favored confirmation, 33% opposed it, and 37% were unsure.
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Presidential approval is also telling in this regard. For November 14-16, 201846, and still
using data from the Economist/YouGov respondent panel, President Trump’s overall approval
ratings were within his historically normal range with 44% approving and 54% disapproving47.
Among Republican identifiers his approval was at 88% (67% “strongly” and 27% “somewhat”)
and 1% “not sure,” while his disapproval rating among Democrats was almost the mirror
opposite with 88% disapproving (79% “strongly” and 9% “somewhat”) and 2% “not sure.”
Independents were more evenly divided with 35% approving (either “strongly” or “somewhat”),
50%

disapproving,

and

15%

“not

sure.”

By

comparison,

President

Obama’s

approval/disapproval ratings were generally more favorable than Trump’s, especially in the early
part of his first administration, but overall showed much the same divergence when examined by
respondent partisan identification (Democrat identifiers tended to be more approving and
Republican identifiers tended to be more disapproving48).
Given the vast disparity in the numbers, the major question is whether such an effect can
be explained in terms of something other than partisan attitudes and affiliations. All respondents
have access to the same information on economic performance, markets, foreign affairs, and the
rest, so any significant variation should be explainable through the perception of that
information. The question of whether responsibility for events is consistently attributed is one
which requires further attention. As proposed by Sirin and Villalobos (2011), internal/external
attribution is driven predominantly by partisan identification. Thus, it seems likely that when
information perceived as positive is received, in-group members would tend to attribute it to
factors internal to “our team” while out-group members would tend to attribute it to factors
external to “their team.” For example, while declining unemployment rates might be internally
attributed to the incumbent president’s economic policies by that party’s supporters, opponents
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Chosen because it was the most recent data rather than due to any significant events.
Gallup’s data for the same timeframe was 43% approve and 53% disapprove.
48 Jacobson’s (2016) Gallup data shows Obama’s approval among Republicans dropping from close to 40% at the
time of his inauguration in 2009 to about 10% by late 2010. It stayed around 10% for the remainder of his time in
office. Approval among Democrats remained between 80% and 90% for both terms.
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of the president’s party might externally emphasize the enduring effects of the previous
president’s economic policies or other factors outside the incumbent president’s control. The
overall tendency should therefore be that positive information is attributable to the respondent’s
favored side, while negative information is attributable to the respondent’s disfavored side.
While understandable, this leads back to the issue pertaining to the framing and presentation of
the questions from which the approval data is generated.
Using Economist/YouGov data for November 11-13, 2018 (N=1,500 US adults) (The
Economist/YouGov 2018c), “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is
handling these specific issues?” strongly suggests that whatever the status quo might be or might
be expected to be, Trump bears some degree of responsibility for it. Although there is not public
access to the actual questionnaire presented to panel respondents, YouGov’s presentation on
these types of questions is commonly the broader question followed by the specific issue areas,
similar to Figure 3-1 below. On political issue opinions, the response set does not generally
allow for responses other than strength of approval/disapproval and “not sure,” although it is also
possible to leave a response blank or to skip the question entirely, more or less equivalent to a
“NA” response in other surveys. I do note that YouGov surveys are heavily internet-based,
which raises issues of selection bias in their sampling methodology. I find no indication that the
resulting data are weighted, but it is possible that the panel itself is weighted prior to the
collection of the data, which should have a similar effect. Regardless of whether one approves or
disapproves of the president and his behaviors, issue domains such as budget deficits require the
cooperation of other actors to occur and “the economy” is an amalgamation of multiple actors,
both domestic and international, so the assumption of sole attribution to the president becomes
problematic, lending more credence to the idea of political attitudes being shaped by perceptions
of the object’s group membership.
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Figure 3.1: Sample Economist/YouGov Approval Question (not real)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling these issues?
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
approve
approve
disapprove
disapprove
Abortion
Budget deficit
Civil rights
Economy

Not
sure

As an aside and on the specific issue of budget deficits, Dick Cheney is often noted for
his comment that “deficits don’t matter” (Suskind 2004), although the full comment was that
“Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter” and it was made in the context of a tax cut proposal.
But a more descriptive rendition of that might be, “deficits don’t matter as long as it’s our guy in
the White House.” Tesler (2013) found that Republicans were less likely to see deficits as an
important problem while Bush was president, but strikingly more likely to see them as an
important problem while Obama was president, with the reverse being the case for Democrats.
An important question is the degree to which education and information affect attribution in very
broad issue domains which require the coordinated efforts of multiple actors who do not share a
partisan affiliation. Are more educated or more informed respondents more likely to be less
judgmental by not giving sole attribution for economic changes to the incumbent president while
respondents with less education/information might tend to be more accepting of claims of sole
credit or blame? This question cannot be explored with my current data, so other effects must be
relegated to other research.
The simplicity of the partisan identity framework and its in/out-group effects belies
several important considerations. In no particular order of importance, they are how survey data
treats self-identifying Independents, the conception of partisanship in survey construction, the
assumption of the stability of party identification over time, presidential vote as indicative of
issue preferences, party identification as indicative of issue preferences, and the nature of the
electorate in drawing conclusions about levels of polarization.
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3.1

THE TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENTS AND “LEANERS”
Political opinion surveys almost always ask about party identification in the normal

course of assessing the respondents’ opinions on various political issues, often with the net result
that the quality of the data stems primarily from the representativeness of the sample and the
modality through which the data is collected because “do you consider yourself to be a
Democrat, a Republican, Independent, or something else?” is a canonical and expected question.
The ANES surveys have included a party identification question in all administrations since
1952. For ANES, the question is typically presented as a two-part item with party identification
in one part and strength of identification (strong/weak) in the second. In the two-part
presentation, respondents who initially give Independent, no party preference, “don’t know,”
“other” or similar responses, are asked whether they are closer to the Democrats or the
Republicans. The meaning of “closer to” is left to the respondent, but those who respond to the
second part with a party preference are categorized as “leaners.” Other surveys commonly adopt
a 7-point scale and the respondent may select points 3 or 5, which are typically labeled as
something

like

“Independent–Democrat/Republican”

or

“Independent–lean

Democrat/Republican,” while “Lean Democrat/Republican” (with no indication of Independent)
is also used. The problem with both forms of presentation is not so much with the “strong” and
“weak” party identifiers, as these respondents clearly identify with one party or the other, but
with the treatment of the “leaners” in the subsequent data analysis.
The classification of these leaning independents involves several assumptions and the
first is a pragmatic one. The reality of American national election outcomes is that candidates
who are not identified with one of the two major parties will be very rarely be elected49, so voters
are assumed to have preferences which align with one of the major parties. Thus, the implied

49

Of the current voting members of the House of Representatives, all associate with one of the two major parties.
Of the 100 members of the Senate, two are not officially associated with one of the major parties, but both caucus
with the Democrats. Considering his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in the 2016 primary, I
leave the question of whether Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders is an Independent or a Democrat to the reader. A few
third-party Representatives and Senators have been elected during the country’s history, but they are a tiny fraction
in comparison to the number who officially identify with one of the major parties.
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framing of the question for respondents classified as “leaning” is “since you must ultimately
choose one of the two parties, which do you prefer?” On the other hand, accepting Independents
as not wishing to associate with either party leads to an implicit framing of “we accept that you
do not want to identify with a party, but do you think you are more like the Democrats or
Republicans?” In other words, a respondent who does not profess identity with one party or the
other is assumed to have an identification with one unless they specifically reject both, often
after being asked multiple times (as in ANES’ presentation). From the survey construction
perspective, this might be done with good reason. In the ANES party identification responses
since 196850, about 1% of respondents identify as “other” while about 6.4% express “no
preference” or favor “neither,” but this is conceivably an artifact of the question framing and
presentation. The literature on this and similar issues is mixed. The current idea of party leaners
being “closet partisans” who, in most respects aside from party identification behave as partisans
has its foundation in Keith, et al. (1986 and 1992), who based their findings on Presidential,
Senate, and House vote choices. The reasoning behind this approach seems sound enough:
Democrats vote for Democratic candidates, Republicans vote for Republican candidates. Thus, if
a “leaner” votes for a candidate in the direction of their leaning, they are behaving as a partisan.
In part, the Keith group’s argument is flawed because of their use of voting behavior in House
elections and their data was collected at a time when some regions of the country lacked an
effective opposition party. But even bringing the data forward in time by looking at House
elections in 2016 and 2018, the assumption of partisanship may be questionable due to the
lopsided character of many House elections.
The dataset for the 2016 House elections was compiled in 2017 and the dataset for 2018
was compiled shortly after the general election. I coded contests as “unopposed” for candidates
who faced no opponent, a write-in/3rd party candidate, or an opponent within their own party.
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Although party identification has been asked about since 1952, the difficulty of separating the respondents who
identify as other than Democrat, Republican, or Independent in the pre-1968 data makes it simpler to ignore the
earlier administrations. From 1968 through 2016, less than 400 ANES respondents either were not asked or refused
to identify with a party or identify themselves as Independent.
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California has open primaries and the general election is between the best two winners of the
primary election, so while some general election contests were closely fought, they were
between candidates from the same party and I counted it as 100% of the vote for that party.
Louisiana does not hold primaries, so general election contests are often between multiple
candidates and plurality winners are not uncommon. The margin of victory was calculated as the
difference between the winner and their next closest competitor, regardless of party. Contested
elections were then divided into contests where the winner garnered more than 60% of the vote
(the generally used cutoff for a “landslide” victory and perhaps an indicator of token opposition),
56% to 60% of the vote (margin of victory between 11% and 20%) counted as a “comfortable”
margin, and 55% or less (10% or less margin of victory) as “close,” although a 10% margin of
victory in a two-candidate contest may be a somewhat loose conception of “close.” In the 2016
House elections, 254 seats (58.4%) were won by margins in excess of 20%, not including the 62
uncontested seats (14.3%); 35 contests (8%) were “close;” and 84 seats (19.3%) were won by
comfortable margins. For 2018, 41 seats (9.4%) were uncontested, 230 seats (52.9%) were won
by landslide or better margins, 73 seats (16.8%) were won by comfortable margins, and 91
contests (20.9%) were close, including 48 where the margin of victory was 5% or less. The
exceptionally large number of contests where the winner polled at landslide or better margins
may be an indicator that there is almost no effective opposition in those districts and a leaning
partisan vote in these districts does not say much about their leanings, either for or against.
Without correcting for the usual inflation of self-reported voting, less than half of leaning
Democrats report voting for the Democratic candidate51 between 1952 and 2016 (47.1% on
average), although many more reported not voting (41.3% on average) than reported voting for
the Republican candidate (11.6% on average). By the same token, leaning Republicans reported
voting for the Republican candidate more often than leaning Democrats (57.5% on average), and
reported not voting (33.8% on average) more often than voting for the Democratic candidate
51

Because of its inconsistent appearance in the data, self-reported voting for third-party candidates (Wallace,
Anderson, Perot, etc.) was excluded from the totals for each year.
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(8.7% on average). While a third-party vote is clearly a vote for “neither” when it comes to the
major parties, the interesting question, and I have no data with which to explore it, is how many
of the abstainers chose not to vote as a protest to the major party’s candidate. Until Zaller’s
(2012, 612) concern (“the key problem in this area [is] what people mean by their survey
responses”) can be resolved, the true status of leaning partisans will likely remain a contested
area of scholarship.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below show the resulting distribution of party identification when
leaners are treated as partisans and when they are treated as Independents. If, as in Figure 3.2,
“leaners” are grouped with partisans, the divisions among the electorate are accentuated because
“pure” Independents (those who specifically refuse to identify with either party across both
questions) constitute a small slice of the whole (11.3% on average), lending some credence to the
polarization narrative as the contest between the parties becomes one of which party can muster
the largest number of their supporters on election day. This makes election victory a function of
the relative proportions of Democrats and Republicans in that portion of the electorate which
turns out at election time. It also demonstrates the resulting problem when the public is, as in
Fiorina’s conception, closely but not deeply divided. While Wlezien’s (1995) thermostat analogy
is a useful way of looking at preferences in relation to election outcomes, thermostats are not
generally thought of as on/off switches. Instead, they function as a preset where if the
temperature moves inside or outside of certain bounds, the currently selected device (the heater
or the air conditioner) turns on or off. Fiorina’s (2017) portrayal of electoral majorities as being
unstable, however, lends itself more to being analogous to a seesaw where small shifts among
some segments of the population can quickly tilt in one direction or the other.
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Figure 3.2: Respondent Party Identification Percentages by Year (Leaners Included with
Partisans and excluding DK/Ref/NA/Missing)

Figure 3.3: Respondent Party Identification Percentages by Year (Leaners Included with
Independents and excluding DK/Ref/NA/Missing)

Figure 3.3, on the other hand, accepts the leaners’ initial claims of independence or no
preference at face value and shows a more balanced distribution where Independents account for
approximately a third of the electorate (33.9% on average). This is also in line with the
presentation of the question of party identity in other surveys, such as some exit polls, where
respondents may only choose between Democrat, Republican, and Independent without a
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“leaning” option. In this scenario, the conflict between the parties becomes one of either gaining
the support of the uncommitted or at least not antagonizing them to the point where they will
vote for the other party, much in keeping with the traditional median voter theorem discussed in
Chapter 1.
3.2

THE STABILITY OF PARTISAN IDENTITY
Since Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ The American Voter (1961), party

identification has been assumed to be stable over time. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989,
1126) noted that less than 4% of respondents in panel studies switched party identification
(Democrat to Republican or vice versa) over a four-year period, with somewhat larger numbers
moving into and out of the Independent classification. In fact, party identification was assumed
to be so persistent that some analysists (e.g. Achen 1975) attributed it to measurement error52
rather than actual switching, and party identification has at times been treated as the ultimate
independent variable53. Commenting on the persistence of party identification, Green, Palmquist,
and Schickler (2002, 3) noted that “sex, religion, and class were weaker predictors of the vote for
Ronald Reagan [in 1980] than was party identification measured during the Johnson
administration.”54 A critical question to be addressed in this area, however, is “in virtue of what
is someone a Democrat or Republican?” Green, et al. (2002) are somewhat at odds with attempts
to answer this question through a rationality framework (e.g., Downs 1957, Key 1966, and their
progeny) or an ideological one (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) in that they propose
partisanship to be more a function of social identity55 than of rational evaluations of performance
in office, support for party platforms, or ideological leanings.
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Achen’s major thesis on this point was that the researcher cannot control for the salience or uncertain meaning of
survey questions to the respondent (“fuzziness” (p. 1225)) and cannot control for exogenous informational shocks
which might exert some change upon the respondent at different points in time. See RePass (1971) for similar
conclusions regarding issue salience.
53 Achen and Bartels (2006, 34, quoted in Zaller 2012, 583) refer to it as the “gold standard” of attitudinal stability.
54 Green, et al. (2002) based their observation on panel data obtained from the Youth-Parent Socialization Study
(Jennings, Markus, Niemi, and Stoker 2005); the initial wave of the panel study was done in 1965 and the final wave
in 1997.
55 See also DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson’s (1996) explanation of their assumptions.
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The larger question of “what is identity?” will have to be assigned to future study except
to the extent that statements such as “I am a(n) _____” or “She/He is a(n) ______” can be taken
here as indicators of one or more types of identity and that identities can be either ascribed or
acquired. Ascribed identity requires no action on the part of the holder and includes
characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, and so forth. Acquired identities require action,
either physical or cognitive, on the part of the holder. One may be female by virtue of ascribed
identity, for example, but feminist or not by virtue of acquired identity. But is partisan identity
ascribed or acquired? Niemi and Jennings (1991) propose that it is a function of family
background such that people raised in Democrat households generally tend to identify as
Democrats, while people raised in Republican households generally tend to identify as
Republicans. Accepting this as being the case in some or even most cases, does conformance
with the expected attitudes and behaviors associated with that identity indicate real agreement
with those attitudes or are they merely rote behavior?
Consider, for example, African-American respondents to the ANES surveys. Across all
administrations, about 80% who expressed a partisan identification identified with the
Democratic Party (strong, weak, or leaning) with African American females being notably more
partisan in their attitudes and behaviors. This drops to 68% if leaners are counted as
Independents but is still a very strong effect. This tendency to identify with the Democrats seems
to have begun during the New Deal era and accelerated during the Civil Rights movement with
that identification being higher in more recent years (88% in 2008 and 2012, and 84% in 2016)56,
but I note that it does not have similar correspondence with liberal-conservative leanings. In
2008, about 21% of African-Americans identifying as strong Democrats also identified as being
any shade of liberal. This rose to 34% in 2012 and dropped back to 25% in 2016 (the percentages
are lower and less consistent with weak and leaning identifiers). This would seem to indicate that
in this case the partisan identity behaves more like an ascribed identity, in keeping with Niemi
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I do not explore the relationship between the change in African-American party identification in 2016 and the
candidacy of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 but would accept this explanation as being reasonable.
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and Jennings (1991), rather than one acquired through other means. This leads to questions about
the nature of parties, partisanship, and partisan identity which require some sort of answer before
partisanship as identity can be more fully addressed.
3.3

PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP
Although there are many conceptions of political parties, Sartori’s (1976, 64) minimal

definition requires the fewest moving parts: “any political group that presents at elections, and is
capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office;” wherein only a group and the
ability to field a candidate are required. Its candidate-centered approach might seem rather
limiting, but the choice presented to voters at an election, especially in the United States, is
between candidates, so anything more than these two requirements goes to the likelihood of
being able to win an election or reasons why a candidate should be elected rather than to the
nature of the parties themselves. It is perhaps for this reason that the standard indicator of
partisanship is not so much what the respondent believes in the realm of issues and ideology, but
for whom they vote. To this extent, a party’s primary goal becomes the election of a candidate
and its primary function becomes the employment of the most effective means of accomplishing
that.
It is a vast oversimplification of Converse (1964) to claim that he believed the electorate
to be largely ideologically unconstrained, uninformed, and politically unsophisticated. It would
be more accurate interpretation to describe his conception of the electorate as one of it being
composed of individuals of differing interests, circumstances, outlooks, and levels of information
who are regularly called upon to select officials to represent them in making decisions which will
affect those interests and circumstances, and doing so within the constraints of low levels of
information, a general lack of consistent internal direction (ideological constraint), and
prospective uncertainty regarding the candidates from whom they must select. Political parties
act to encourage the selection of their candidate by trying to rectify those shortcomings in a
manner which is favorable to their candidates.
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Unlike the more abstract liberal and conservative dimensions, which tend more toward an
“in an ideal world” approach, political parties purport to represent concrete agendas with an eye
toward increasing the voters’ levels of information in a manner which reduces prospective
uncertainty by advertising how their candidate will advance the voters’ interests and
circumstances. But because of voters’ differing and sometimes competing interests (and levels of
interest), an agenda which appeals to all voters is impossible, so parties must choose their
positions with an eye toward how that position will improve the chances of their candidates’
elections. Consider, by way of example, the 2016 Democratic plank of free college education57,
which was added following Senator Bernie Sanders’ primary campaign. Perhaps awakening to
the notion that blue-collar workers were a significantly larger share of its base than the collegeeducated, the Democrats’ 2018 campaign rhetoric, if it spoke of college education at all, was
centered more around “affordable” than “free.”
In some respects, political parties behave like aggressive salespeople: “you may not think
that you need this, but trust me, you really need this.” Thus, it becomes one of the functions of a
party to show that not only do an avocado grower, a diesel mechanic, and a hedge fund manager
have interests which align, but also that helping one will help, or at least not hurt, the others. It is
this situation which makes the “big tents” analogy a reasonably appropriate description of
political parties and it is why disparate groups such as Big and Small Business interests, Pro-Life
activists, and Agricultural interests can coexist within one of those tents: their practical and issue
interests do not overlap much. By appealing to each, the party hopes to gain the support of all,
while the potential support for the larger party agenda increases and with it the chance of a
favorable election outcome. Considering the variety of interests that are represented within the
Democratic and Republican tents, it is hardly surprising that the wider electorate might choose to
identify with one of the major parties but have little interest in its agenda aside from a bare
handful of issues in which they might be interested. Zaller (2012) noted that most voters do have
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The plank was applicable to “working-class families” and limited to public colleges, universities, and community
colleges.
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real policy preferences, but also that surveys do not often ask about them, focusing instead on
issues which the survey architects perceive to be of interest. Thus, the expectation would be to
find little consistency between party identification and issue preference responses and the
surprising finding would be if any significant consistency were found.
Converse’s offense at a request that he address the question “How Dumb Are the Voters
Really?” (Converse 2000, 331) is quite understandable as voters are far from dumb. At worst,
they are simply inattentive and ill- or misinformed and/or narrowly focused on a few issues to
the exclusion of others. As I have argued elsewhere, when a voter steps into the voting booth,
they know what they know, and they believe what they believe. That this may not rise to even a
minimal level of epistemological rigor is irrelevant because they will vote based upon the
information they have or think they have, and scholars, candidates, and parties cannot force them
to have anything more than that. All that can be done is to accept that the electoral system should
work to produce beneficial outcomes over the long term. If Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
(Arrow 1963) is correct, no electoral system can produce consistently fair and acceptable
outcomes. What they produce, all else being equal, is the best that can be expected under the
prevailing conditions.
3.4

PARTISANSHIP AND PARTISAN ANIMOSITY
The existence and strength of the animosity between partisan identifiers remains to be

explored. Before delving into this question, the question of the effects of extreme candidate
agendas has been alluded to, but not addressed. Absent more in-depth access to data with which
to work, I must rely on Cohen, et al.’s (2016) conclusion that with respect to presidential
elections, there is no significant electoral penalty for a candidate taking an extreme position and
no significant electoral reward for taking a moderate one. What seems to matter more as far as
the voters are concerned is the interaction of the economy (Real Disposable Income [RDI] as
measured in the 14th and 15th quarters of the president’s second term) and the length of time the
president’s party has been in office (see Zaller 2012, 615, but see Wlezien 1995 for a similar
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effect). There remains much room for elite rhetoric and structural effects to play their role in this
conception, however. RDI had been increasing steadily throughout both of Obama’s terms and
rose at approximately an annualized 2% rate during Q2 and Q3 of 2016 (St. Louis Federal
Reserve data). By this conception, Hillary Clinton should have won the 2016 presidential
election. That she did not is indicative that the more parsimonious explainer may not necessarily
be the better predictor. It worked as an indicator of the popular vote but failed to account for the
institutional effects of the Electoral College.
Returning to the conception of in/out-group identity, there are three available group
feeling thermometer indicators which go to partisan group perceptions: Democrats/Republicans,
Democratic Party/Republican Party, and Liberals/Conservatives. Interestly, 1980 is the single
ANES administration in which all three groups of feeling thermometer question were presented,
and this allows the exploration of an interesting question: to what extent do respondents see these
groups seen as being similar things? I exclude all DK/Ref/NA responses from all six
thermometers, resulting in N=1,185 for the Democrat/Liberal side and N=1,213 for the
Republican/Conservative side. The correlations between Democrat and Democratic Party (0.63)
and between Republican and Republican Party (0.56) are the strongest, with the correlations
between Democrat and Liberal (0.42) and Democratic Party and Liberal (0.39) being much
weaker. This may be partially explainable in terms of the incumbent president (Jimmy Carter)
having faced a strong primary challenger from within his own party (Senator Ted Kennedy) who
painted him as being too conservative58, so Democrats and the Democratic Party might have
been caught in the overspray. Interestingly, and aside from Lyndon Johnson’s early decision to
withdraw in 1968, this was probably the most contentious challenge to an incumbent president
from within his own party since 1912. John Anderson’s third-party candidacy59 seems likely to
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By Cohen, et al.’s (2016) analysis, Carter in 1980 was the least liberal Democratic candidate of the postwar
period, although he was clearly a moderate rather than a conservative. This may also have contributed to Reagan’s
ability to successfully campaign as strong conservative, but Carter’s reelection bid was also accompanied by
lingering economic problems and the Iran hostage crisis, so there were other factors affecting perceptions.
59 Anderson dropped out of the Republican Party primary contests and ran as a moderate alternative to Reagan.
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have had a greater impact on Reagan’s campaign than on Carter’s. The correlation between
Republicans and Conservative (0.50) is stronger than that between Democrats and Liberals,
again possibly due to effects within the Democratic Party. However, the correlation between
Republican Party and Conservative (0.35) is close to that of Democratic Party and Liberal.
Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.73 for the Democratic side and 0.71 for the Republican side, so all
components are consistently covarying for each side. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 below show the
marginal effects of the thermometers on each other.

Table 3.1: Effects of Democrat/Liberal Feeling Thermometers (1980, N=1,185)
DV

Democrats

Democrats
-Democratic
0.66***
Party
Liberals
0.33***
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016

Democratic
Party
0.47***

Liberals

SE

R2

0.20***

0.02

0.44

--

0.16***

0.02

0.41

0.18***

--

0.03

0.21

Table 3.2: Effects of Republican/Conservative Feeling Thermometers (1980, N=1,213)

DV

Republicans

Republicans
-Republican
0.62***
Party
Conservatives
0.46***
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016

Republican
Party
0.39***

Conservatives

SE

R2

0.34***

0.02

0.43

--

0.09***

0.03

0.33

0.07***

--

0.03

0.26

These results suggest that Democrat/Democratic Party and Republican/Republican Party
are distinguishable but mostly interchangable in the respondents’ minds, while Liberals and
Conservatives are conceived of as being quite different from the parties and their supporters. It
also is quite clear that while respondents strongly associate Republicans with the Republican
Party, the connection in respondents’ minds between either of them and Conservatives is tenuous
at best. I propose this with the caution that this analysis reflects a single year and that year is
66

about a full decade prior to the realignment of the South, so parties and their elites were still
largely heterogeneous. The absence of one or more of the indicators in other ANES
administration years do not provide the opportunity to conduct a more substantial analysis, but a
different dataset with similar indicators for other years would provide much greater traction in
approaching the question.
Partisan rhetoric has often tended toward the acrimonious. It is very difficult for a
candidate to propose why they would be a better choice without also stating or at least implying
that their opponent would be a worse one. As Hetherington (2009) and Layman, Carsey, and
Menasce Horowitz (2006) have shown, divergence between the parties has been the norm
throughout most of the country’s history, although normally confined to a handful of issues,
while the seemingly unpolarized politics of the two or three postwar decades has been mostly
due to the ideological heterogeneity of the two parties. But this heterogeneity means that the
parties and their elites hold outlooks and issue positions that, as discussed, most of the electorate
is either uninformed on and/or unaware of their importance (often due to low salience). The
realignment of the parties (sorting) means that the party elites now hold more uniform outlooks
and positions, but the level of information in the electorate seems to remain low (in 2016, about
25% of ANES respondents were still unable to identify the Republican Party as the more
conservative party) and the voters are either uninformed on those issues or do not find them
important. In order for issue divergence to be the cause of any animosity, there must be some
core set of issues about which the voters possess some degree of information (even if it is
incorrect information) or about which they care deeply. Considering the problem of timebounded issue questions and the lack of correlation between issues that the respondents see as
most imporant, survey data on issue positions may be a weak indicator of partisan leanings and
an even weaker one of individual preferences.
As using the ability to identify the Republican Party as the more conservative party at the
national level acted as a control for the indicator of ideological tendencies in Chapter 2, there
needs to be some indicator that can be used to demonstrate that partisan affiliation is based on
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something more than whim or a coin flip. For all presidential election cycles except 1956, and
including a handful of midterm cycles in the 1980s and 1990s, ANES has asked respondents
whether there are important differences in what the Democrats and Republicans stand for 60, and
respondents could respond with yes, no, or don’t know. Responding with “no” or “don’t know”
raises an interesting question in that identifying with a major party while also asserting that there
are no important differences between the parties implies that for these respondents the contest
between the parties may be more like “Coke vs. Pepsi” than “us vs. them.” While 2012 and 2016
had the lowest rate of respondents who saw no important differences between the parties (about
16%) and 2004/2008 were next-largest at about 25%, more than a third and sometimes more than
half of respondents in earlier administrations have provided this same kind of response. “Pure”
independents have tended to be the largest group of identifiers who do this in recent years, but
Democrats and Republicans of all types (strong, weak, and leaning) do it in large proportions, as
shown in Tables 3.3A and 3.3B below.
Table 3.3A. Percentage of Partisan Identifiers Seeing No Important Differences
Between the Democratic and Republican Parties
Party ID
1952 1960 1964 1966 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1986 1988
Strong
8.4
2.7
1.2
7.3
5.8
5.6
4.8
4.9
4.4
5.6
5.1
Democrat
Weak
14.4 8.1
9.7 19.9 14.6 15.1 12.2 11.1 6.4 12.3 8.3
Democrat
Independent
5.0 13.0 13.5 6.4
4.9
5.0
6.3
5.4
4.1
5.3
4.6
Democrat
Independent
3.1
2.7
4.0
9.9
6.6
9.4 11.6 9.8
7.8 11.1 8.2
Independent
3.6
5.6
4.6
3.6
4.7
6.7
6.0
3.6
5.7
5.9
5.4
Republican
Weak
8.3
3.4
2.0 10.4 7.5
8.2
8.5
5.4
6.6
8.6
5.5
Republican
Strong
5.6
7.6
7.0
2.0
3.5
3.9
2.9
1.7
2.4
3.3
3.1
Republican
Total
48.4 43.1 42.0 59.5 47.5 53.8 52.2 42.0 37.5 52.2 40.3
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
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There are large number of respondents who were not presented with this question in 1972, 1984, 1986, 1990, and
1996 due to variations in the survey instruments used, so the sample size for these administrations is substantially
reduced.
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Table 3.3B. Percentage of Partisan Identifiers Seeing No Important Differences Between the
Democratic and Republican Parties (1948-2016)
Party ID
1990 1992
Strong
6.8
4.3
Democrat
Weak
11.2
6.6
Democrat
Independent
7.1
6.3
Democrat
Independent
10.3
8.2
Independent
7.1
5.3
Republican
Weak
9.2
6.2
Republican
Strong
2.6
2.9
Republican
Total
54.4 39.8
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016

1994

1996

1998

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

5.9

3.9

4.3

5.0

2.1

3.7

2.2

1.5

11.3

8.3

8.3

5.3

4.9

4.3

2.8

2.3

7.1

7.0

5.8

6.1

5.0

4.8

2.4

2.0

7.9

5.1

8.8

6.5

4.2

6.1

5.4

5.0

5.6

4.0

5.6

4.3

2.8

2.8

2.2

2.0

7.5

4.4

6.2

4.1

2.0

1.8

1.9

1.8

2.6

1.7

3.1

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.6

1.0

47.9

34.6

42.0

33.3

22.4

24.5

17.5

15.5

Some (e.g., Abramowitz and Campbell) point to the decreasing numbers of respondents
who see no important difference between the parties as indicative of growing polarization in the
electorate, but it seems more indicative of growing levels of information, making it slightly (and
only slightly) more difficult to identify with a party without understanding that it is different
from the other party. As with many other survey items, Zaller’s (2012) observation of the central
problem of public opinion research is particularly appropriate to this question. When a
respondent asserts that there are no important differences between the parties, do they mean there
are no meaningful policy and agenda differences; that there are no behavioral differences such
that they see both parties as perhaps being corrupt, driven by money, or uncommitted to the
needs of the needs of their constituents; do they mean that both sides will engage in bailouts, or
produce negative economic effects (government shutdowns or favoring corporate interests, for
example); or do they mean something else?
But this does raise a question about how one can see no important differences between
parties and give differing feeling thermometer responses for their members. On what basis could
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a Democrat, for example, claim that there were no important differences between the two parties,
yet give lower feeling thermometer ratings to the Republican Party than to the Democratic Party?
The more likely explanation would be that even if there are no important differences between the
two groups, one still represents an in-group and one represents an out-group. While the “no
important differences” variable should produce smaller marginal effects on the feeling
thermometers and may be more indicative of an “us vs. not-us” perspective than an “us vs. them”
one, the in-group should still receive greater favor from the respondent.
To test this idea, I regress partisan identification against the feeling thermometers for
both parties. This serves to exclude ANES administrations prior to 1980 as these questions were
not presented, but I am more interested in the current effects of partisanship than the historical
ones. I exclude all DK/Ref/NA responses from all variables. This is done more for coding
reasons than from any belief that people who do not know where they stand on a particular
question have no meaningful responses to other questions. This test is similar to the ideology vs.
feeling thermometer test in Chapter 2, but requires three models. The first model tests all
partisans against the Democratic Party and Republican Party feeling thermometers. The second
model tests partisans who acknowledge important differences between the parties, while the third
tests partisans who see no important differences between the parties. I expect that the exclusion
of the “no important differences” partisans will produce signficantly stronger marginal effects
from the rest, especially as the parties realign, while the exclusion of the “important differences”
partisans will produce signficantly weaker effects. Because of the scaling of both the partisanship
and feeling thermometers, one should expect to see negative effects when regressing against the
Democratic Party and positive effects when regressing against the Repblican Party. The full
regression results tables may be found in Appendix B, but an abbreviated version is below in
Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Partisanship on Party
Feeling Thermometers (FT)

Table 3.5: Effect of Partisanship on Party
Feeling Thermometers (FT) for
“Important Differences”
Respondents

Democrat
Republican
FT
FT
2
Year
ME
R
ME
R2
1980
-7.12
0.38
5.37
0.25
1984
-6.21
0.43
6.75
0.34
1986
-6.96
0.42
6.43
0.31
1988
-7.19
0.41
6.89
0.35
1990
-6.01
0.33
5.70
0.34
1992
-7.04
0.41
6.27
0.36
1994
-7.72
0.48
6.06
0.35
1996
-7.99
0.47
6.58
0.36
1998
-6.94
0.38
6.93
0.49
2000
-8.21
0.47
6.75
0.36
2004
-7.87
0.49
8.71
0.49
2008
-8.91
0.51
7.99
0.39
2012
-10.21 0.57
9.04
0.48
2016
-10.28 0.56
8.17
0.42
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
All results are significant at p<0.001

Democrat
Republican
FT
FT
2
Year
ME
R
ME
R2
1980
-7.60 0.45
5.98
0.31
1984
-7.62 0.50
7.55
0.43
1986
-8.22 0.57
7.73
0.45
1988
-7.85 0.49
7.52
0.43
1990
-6.55 0.43
6.95
0.36
1992
-7.57 0.50
6.99
0.39
1994
-8.66 0.61
7.50
0.52
1996
-8.52 0.55
7.25
0.45
1998
-7.73 0.48
7.64
0.43
2000
-8.61 0.55
7.15
0.43
2004
-8.06 0.52
9.22
0.55
2008
-9.36 0.57
8.45
0.46
2012
-10.41 0.61
9.38
0.53
2016
-10.60 0.60
8.44
0.47
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
All results are significant at p<0.001
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Table 3.6: Effect of Partisanship on Party
Feeling Thermometers (FT)
for “No Important
Differences” Respondents
Democrat
Republican
FT
FT
2
Year
ME
R
ME
R2
1980
-6.00
0.25
4.03
0.13
1984
-5.86
0.31
4.71
0.18
1986
-5.26
0.26
3.99
0.15
1988
-5.59
0.25
5.42
0.21
1990
-5.32
0.26
3.51
0.11
1992
-5.84
0.26
4.53
0.15
1994
-5.83
0.28
3.48
0.11
1996
-6.39
0.25
5.03
0.20
1998
-5.34
0.21
5.19
0.19
2000
-6.88
0.29
5.50
0.19
2004
-6.34
0.32
6.18
0.23
2008
-6.60
0.24
5.41
0.15
2012
-8.64
0.30
6.01
0.17
2016
-6.99
0.21
5.41
0.14
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
All results are significant at p<0.001
A few things jump out from the results in Table 3.4. Most importantly, the strength of the
effect of partisanship on both feeling thermometers is reasonably consistent and the marginal
effects tend to increase over time, becoming noticably stronger in the 1990s and forward. This is
much in line with the polarization narrative advanced by Abramowitz, Campbell, and others. The
standard errors (see the regression tables in Appendix B) are all about a fourth of a “degree” or
less, and the explanatory power of the model becomes stronger as the effects increase. That the
Republican side of the model does not produce the same magnitude of effects as the Democratic
side may be explainable in terms similar to the effect of the “Moderate” ideological label on
attitudes toward “Conservatives” seen in Chapter 2 in that they generally held warmer feelings
for the right than for the left. But the explanatory power of this model is several times better than
the ideology-based model despite the similar approach of working from a simple identity label.
Table 3.5 above shows a somewhat stronger relationship among partisans who saw important
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differences between the parties, but it is interesting that the explanatory power on the Republican
side seldom exceeds .5 in either Model 1 (Table 3.4) or Model 2 (Table 3.5), but it consistently
does so on the Democratic side for Model 2.
The marginal effects for Model 3 (Table 3.6) are consistently lower than for either of the
other models and its explanatory power, especially on the Republican side, is in line with that of
the ideology model. What this Model illustrates more than anything else is a rough
approximation of the extent to which partisan identity may be affecting perceptions of and
attitudes toward in/out-groups without recourse to issue divergence, policy preferences, political
activities, ideological effects, or the other explanatory variables put forward by both sides of the
polarization narrative at various times. That a large portion of the variation in the feeling
thermometers remains unexplained goes to the minimalist nature of the model. One of the
problems with relying on R2 as the measure of explanatory power is that it is subject to inflation
as more regressors are added to the mix. In order to minimize this effect, I have only attempted
to explain what seems to be the largest piece of the puzzle rather than trying to explain all of it.
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion
You can’t get the right answer until you ask the right question.
--unattributed; variation of a poster used in a public-school classroom
On March 30, 1981, Ronald Reagan survived an assassination attempt and, as he was
being treated, joked with the attending doctors, “I hope you are all Republicans.” If this were to
happen today, would it be a humorous or serious question? Shortly after the 2016 election, a
student teased a political science professor about his new media celebrity status after he appeared
on some local news programs to provide commentary on the results of the 2016 election. His
reply was that his appearance was because most of the other department professors did not want
to talk about it, perhaps an indication that professional detachment can be difficult to maintain,
even among professionals. Drexler (2018) reported patients entering therapy almost immediately
after the 2016 election in order to deal with the feelings of distress and anxiety provoked by it.
The Journal of Clinical Psychology dedicated an entire issue (May 2018) to the topic of how the
politics of both patients and therapists should be handled in therapy sessions. The American
Psychological Association’s annual “Stress in America” (American Psychological Association
2017) reported that 63% of its respondents rated “the future of our nation” as a “somewhat” or
“very” significant source of stress, surpassing the traditional leading stressors of work (62%) and
money (61%), with “the current political climate” (57%) running a close fourth. The importance
of politics as a stressor was higher among Democrats (73%) than among Republicans (56%) or
Independents (59%), although whether those numbers would have held if Clinton had been
elected is an unknown. But that it is reported at all as a significant source of stress raises
questions that cannot be answered within the context of the issue or ideological divergence
frameworks that have traditionally been used to discuss polarization.
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The examination of the wide variety of approaches, issues, and questions in the present
work has not been to discredit or disparage any of the excellent work already done in the field of
polarization research. If polarization means issue divergence, then my analysis comports with
other analyses in that the largest section of the electorate (defined as eligible voters), exhibits
mostly moderate preferences on unimportant issues and stronger preferences on those issues
which they feel are important. This comports with Zaller (1992 and 2012) in the broader
conception of most people responding to survey questions possessing a variety of often
conflicting “considerations” on political issues, which can rise to the level of more consistent
“attitudes” as their political awareness increases. More specifically in the context of polarization,
this comports with both Abramowitz’ and Fiorina’s findings that polarization is mostly confined
to the more aware and informed ends of ideological spectrum where more consistent preferences
manifest as less tractable attitudes toward the positions of the other side. The inescapable
conclusion is that the American electorate is indeed closely divided on a wide array of issues, but
whether they are deeply divided depends largely on whether they are presented with more than
two potential courses of action on any of them. In many respects, my initial task of trying to
bridge Abramowitz and Fiorina is an impossible one. This is not so much because their
approaches differ, but because they do not as both rely on the traditional ideology and issue
divergence framework of polarization. Their main points of departure within this context are
their conception of the electorate and the differences between polarization and sorting. Fiorina is
correct that polarization in the sense of extreme issue divergence being mostly confined to the
noisier ends of the ideological spectrum, a very small portion of the overall pool of citizens, and
that the majority sit near the middle in something approximating a normal distribution of
moderate preferences and opinions, thus being polarized only in the sense of having to choose
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between increasingly divergent offerings. Abramowitz is correct in asserting that this moderate
middle is generally uninformed, apathetic, and shrinking, so it is the more informed and
politically active parts of the spectrum whose preferences count when examining electoral
outcomes61. Additionally, it may be that it is these ends-of-the-spectrum people are the ones who
are driving the divergence between the choices being offered to voters. On the whole, I find
Fiorina’s more inclusive conception of whose opinions count to be the more persuasive and
appealing, but what both sides seem to miss, or at least cannot explain through the traditional
approaches, is that there are two groups of people out there who do not seem to like each other
very much and broader issue divergence is a poor indicator for explaining this dislike.
By Pew’s (2014) reckoning, about 21% of the public sits on the “consistent” tails of the
ideological distribution for the electorate, which is up from 10% in 1994 and 11% in 2004, while
the “mixed” middle has dropped from 49% in 1994 and 2004 to 39% in 2014 (see Figure 4.1
below). Pew sidesteps the question of “what does liberal or conservative mean?” by using an
additive index of agreement/disagreement with ten position statements. Respondents who
provide a liberal response to a statement receive -1 point and those who provide a conservative
response receive +1, resulting in a -10 to +10 scaling. “Consistent” respondents have scaled
scores of negative or positive 7 to 10, “mostly” respondents have scaled scores between negative
or positive 3 and 6, and “mixed” respondents have scaled scores between -2 and +2. This mixed
middle remains a plurality of the electorate and Pew’s data are approximately in line with other
large-N national surveys on the ideological composition of the larger electorate.

61

An unexpressed preference in this context being interpreted as equivalent to “no preference.”
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Figure 4.1: Ideological Consistency of the Electorate (percentages)

When the ideology scale is laid on top of partisan identification, Pew’s (2014) data also
support the assertion of the two parties becoming more ideologically homogeneous. As shown in
Figure 4.2 below, in 1994 about 36% of Republicans62 held ideological views which were more
liberal than those of the median Democrat, and about 30% of Democrats held ideological views
which were more conservative than the median Republican. By 2014, those percentages had
shrunk to 6% of Democrats and 8% of Republicans.

62

Pew also uses a 7-point scale of partisanship identification and includes self-identified “leaners” with partisans.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values

What is surprising and a cause for concern about this 2014 data is that 79% of Democrats
have a “somewhat” (39%) or “very” (39%) unfavorable opinion of Republicans and Republicans
return the sentiment with 82% having “somewhat” (39%) or “very” (42%) unfavorable opinions
of Democrats (see Figure 4.3 below).
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Figure 4.3: Democrat and Republican Favorability Ratings of the Opposing Party

This dislike has reached the point where 27% of all Democrat identifiers see Republicans
as a threat to the nation’s well-being63, while 36% of Republican identifiers see Democrats as a
threat to the nation’s well-being, and I will not venture into President Trump’s more recent
comments regarding media outlets (and CNN in particular) as being enemies of the state. In
support of Abramowitz’ assertions regarding the interaction of ideology and political activity,
these responses are highest among the “politically engaged”64 (44% of engaged Democrats and
51% of engaged Republicans) and the most consistently ideological (50% of consistent liberals
and 66% of consistent conservatives). Conversely, they are lowest among the least ideological
(18% of mixed Democrats and 20% of mixed Republicans) and least engaged (18% of
Democrats and 16% of Republicans). While these consistent liberals and conservatives only

63

Operationalized as the percent of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that
Republican/Democratic Party policies “are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being.”
64 Operationalized as a combination of (1) registered to vote, (2) follow government and public affairs at least “most
of the time,” and (3) report voting “always” or “nearly always.”
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comprise about a tenth of the electorate each, their respective ideologies cannot explain the
larger disagreement and animosity which plays out on an almost daily basis in election
campaigns, the news, and in real life, so the ideology-based explanation either needs to be
revised or a differing explanation needs to be offered to address these effects.
Once an explanation has become the dominant framework, it is not required that the
dominant framework’s adherents continue to demonstrate its efficacy because this was done
when it supplanted the previously dominant explanation. Instead, it is incumbent upon those who
wish to challenge the dominant explanation to not only demonstrate its shortcomings, but to
provide a replacement. Since I am unable to rationalize and explain the increasing amounts of
dislike, animosity, and antagonism within the conventional framework of issue and ideological
divergence, a different approach becomes necessary and to that end, I offer simple partisanship
as its own social identity. I make no claims that this model is a complete one because it is not; it
is only a starting point for one and it is one which requires different data than is collected in the
usual large-N surveys.
I cannot, for example, use ANES or GSS data to explain the collapse of the norms of
behavior among political elites. The US Senate, for example, used to be thought of as the
greatest deliberative body in the world and George Washington once described it as the place
where the hot issues of the House were sent to cool off. Consequently, senators have tended to
act within institutional norms of coolness, comity, and decorum. Yet the levels of division within
the Senate have reached, to a rough approximation, those of the House based on DWNOMINATE data (Carroll, et al. 2015). Theriault and Rohde (2011) assert that almost all this
shift can be attributed to a group of Senators who met three key criteria: (1) they are
Republicans, (2) who previously served in the House, and (3) were first elected after 1978, the
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year when Newt Gingrich was first elected to the House. However, Barber (2016) is also
persuasive in showing that this is not confined to the Republican side of the aisle. Barber’s
analysis of voter preferences taken from the 2012 CCES survey (Ansolabehere and Schaffner
2005-2016), combined with an original 2013 survey of donors who reported donating more than
$200 to a party or candidate65 and DW-NOMINATE data showed that senators’ preferences
were more in line with those of the donors than with those of their constituents, which is very
much in keeping with Bawn, et al.’s (2012) special-interest framework. These types of effects
cannot be explored or explained strictly with large-N survey data.
Large-N survey data can allude to some affective behaviors in the mass publics, however.
Based on Pew’s (2014) data, for example, partisan Americans appear to be increasingly likely to
express unhappiness at the thought of an immediate family member marrying someone of the
opposite party. Concomitantly with that, they appear to be increasingly less likely to describe
supporters of the opposing party in positive terms, such as “intelligent,” and increasingly more
likely to describe them in negative terms, such as “selfish” (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).
Pursuing a line of inquiry in this direction would add strength to the proposed model. Affective
views of the other side should have two potential impacts regarding policy arguments. First, a
positive perception of the opposing side should increase the perception of the validity of its
argument and increase the uncertainty surrounding the supporting argument. Second, a negative
perception of the opposing side should decrease the perception of the validity of its argument
while decreasing the uncertainty surrounding the supporting argument. But when functional and
effective democracy requires compromise, why seek compromise with someone whom you

65

The pool of respondents was compiled from Federal Election Commission reports and divided into out-of-state
donors and in-state donors who both did and did not contribute to the senator seeking reelection. The reported 14%
response rate would have produced a sample of approximately N=2,100.
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believe to be selfish and unintelligent? Anything beyond this sort of analysis requires a different
kind of data arising out of a different theoretical framework than ideology and issues.
And in this context, what is the interaction between elite behavior and mass behavior?
Are ordinary citizens less constrained in their affect toward members of the non-favored group
and this behavior is adopted by the political elites as a means of showing that they share the
attitudes and concerns of their constituents or for some other reason? Or are citizens adopting a
“monkey see, monkey do” approach by mimicking the behaviors they observe among the
political elites or other authority figures by assuming that this is now the norm of political
behavior? It is undoubtedly at least a little bit of each, but which is the greater contributor?
Regarding the “monkey see, monkey do” approach, the “see” part must necessarily be based in
information coming from somewhere. Only a small fraction of the electorate attends campaign
events and rallies to observe political elites firsthand, so they must be getting their information
about elites’ behavior from something other than personal observation. The last time the question
was asked by ANES in 2008, only about 22% of respondents reported that they trusted the media
to report events fairly “most of the time” or “almost all of the time.” 42% believed events were
reported fairly only “some of the time” and 31% believed they were “almost never” fairly
reported, so on what basis do they trust that their perception of political elite behavior is accurate
when it does not come from personal observation? Or perhaps this is an instance similar to
respondents reporting low trust in Congress but liking their representative, so they report low
trust in the media generally, but almost unquestioningly accept information from their preferred
source(s). There is also the effect of people (not just in the political sphere) being more accepting
of information which tends to confirm their existing biases and to be more skeptical of
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disconfirming information. What is the root of those biases, how would one measure and account
for their effects in survey data?
If an accurate and predictive model of these issues and effects could be constructed, then
what? As stated earlier, people know what they know and believe what they believe. What
rectifying measures could or should be implemented which would not seriously impinge on
strenuously guarded civil rights? Could or should “infotainment” programming or even “hard”
news programming be required to adhere to something like “truth in advertising” laws such that
alternating labels of “fact,” “opinion,” “speculation,” and the like be flashed to viewers with each
piece of information? The idea of not deceiving the consumer is not without precedent and the
behavior of the current administration may have increased the awareness of an entire post hoc
fact-checking industry (e.g. factcheck.org, politifact.com, or snopes.com66, among others). The
1983 made-for-TV film, “Special Bulletin,” for example, was filmed in a live-stream news
format and was required to include on-screen notices that it was a dramatization before and after
each commercial break in order to let late-coming viewers know that it was not a live news
program67. If such a policy were to be implemented, then quis custodiet ipsos custodes becomes
a real concern. Even the Congressional Budget Office became a partisan target in the summer of
2017 when its projections of the impacts of the GOP’s health plan were criticized by its
supporters as biased. Could or should similar notices be required for anything purporting to be
news analysis? Could or should political candidates, political activists, political action
committees, and the like be held to a similar set of requirements? Even if it could be required,
would it have any effect on public attitudes and perceptions?
66

All three significantly predate the current administration. Factcheck.org launched in 2003, Politifact launched in
2007, and Snopes has been available since 1994, although the primary focus of its earlier years had been the
investigation of urban myths and legends.
67 The purpose of the disclaimers was to avoid the public reaction which allegedly accompanied Orson Welles’
1939 “War of the Worlds” broadcast.
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In the final analysis and despite the troubling implications of many of these behaviors and
lingering questions, I do not recommend that anyone undergo psychotherapy simply on the basis
of the current political climate being a source of stress68. While the current administration does
appear to be plumbing the depths of belligerence and poor style with a notable lack of decorum
and respect for the norms of presidential behavior, the 2016 election results were not
significantly different from those of the 2000 election. In both cases, the plurality winner of the
popular vote did not receive a majority of the electoral vote, demonstrating that small shifts in
voting behavior can produce significantly different outcomes. George W. Bush gained 54
electoral votes from four states (Florida, Ohio, Nevada and New Hampshire) with only a
plurality of the popular vote; Donald Trump gained 96 electoral votes from seven states (Utah,
Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina) with only a plurality
of the popular vote69. While the Electoral College system may have its detractors and critics, one
of its benefits is that those small shifts in voting behavior are amplified to produce a clear
winner, although whether this was by design or is an unintended side-effect is unknown. I
believe that American institutions are more rugged and durable than many like to give them
credit for being and they have weathered far worse than the current political storms. Even in the
midst of a civil war, the United States conducted free and contested elections and the loser
(George McClellan) accepted his loss. In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt broke with long-standing
tradition to run for a third term70. That this tradition was later codified with the ratification of the
22nd Amendment only demonstrates that there are some norms which retain wide support. This is
not to claim that institutions have not been and will not be further altered or eroded, but they are
a far cry from being on the point of collapse. Assuming Justice Thurgood Marshall’s assertion

68

If you feel that you need the help, by all means seek it.
The plurality result from Utah was the result of 3 rd party candidate, Evan McMullin capturing 21.5% of the
popular vote from the Republican candidate. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton received about 27% of the
popular vote, so Utah should be viewed as a “battleground” state only within the context the Republican Party.
70 U.S. Grant sought a third non-consecutive term in 1880, but James Garfield won the Republican Party’s
nomination; Theodore Roosevelt attempted an unsuccessful 3rd-party run in 1912, though this would have
technically been a second full term had he won.
69
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that the Constitution is a “living document” is correct, then change and adaptation are in their
nature. And, as Key (1966) very astutely observed, “voters are not fools.” When they are
sufficiently tired of the shenanigans, they will act. The information being poured into the
electorate is coming from the noisy ends of the spectrum while the mass in the middle, though it
might be shrinking, is quietly going about its daily business. If Donald Trump’s election truly
was a rejection of political elites as Fiorina (2017, 218) suggests, then elites should perhaps fear
waking the sleeping giant71.

71

Apocryphally attributed to Isoroku Yamamoto, though he likely never said it.
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Appendix A: Ideology-as-Identity Methodology
Spending Indicator Construction
Ellis and Stimson’s (2012) assessment of conservatives holding liberal attitudes regarding
spending bears investigation. Using the ANES CDF, I construct a series of indicators with which
to measure this relationship. The level of spending is indirectly measured through the servicesspending question72. The question is a 7-point scale with points 1 and 7 labeled. I revise the
scale’s directionality to match that of the liberal-conservative self-placement question73 and reset
the scale to a -3 to +3, treating 0 as the “keep it about the same” response. The services-spending
question has been administered in every ANES survey since 1982 with some exceptions. The
data for 2000 does not reflect responses for interviews conducted via telephone (these are coded
as missing). The 2004 administration asked the question in both waves and the CDF contains the
data for the pre-election wave. Two versions of the question were presented in 2008; the data for
the standard question are in the CDF and the data for the new question74 are not.
There are ten federal services-spending areas addressed in the CDF75. Variables and the
years with which the correspond with the liberal-conservative-plus-Republican, indicator:
Year
1972
1976
1984
1988
1990
1992
2004
2008
2012
2016

VCF0886

VCF0887

VCF0889

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

VCF0890

VCF0891

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

VCF0892

VCF0893

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

72

VCF0894

VCF9049

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

With some minor variation in wording in 2004, “Some people think the government should provide fewer
services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is
important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would
you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?”
73 newvar=8-origvar, keeping the DK/NA/INAP responses separate from the rest
74 The focus of the new question was on the services side of the issue with responses scaled from “a lot fewer
services” to “a lot more services”.
75 Until 2012, “or cut out entirely” was included with the “decrease” response
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•

VCF0886: aid to the poor. 3-point scale

•

VCF0887: child care. 3-point scale

•

VCF0889: AIDS research/fight AIDS. 3-point scale

•

VCF0890: public schools. 3-point scale (remove: public good)

•

VCF0891: federal college financial aid. 3-point scale

•

VCF0892: foreign aid. 3-point scale

•

VCF0893: the homeless. 3-point scale

•

VCF0894: welfare programs. 3-point scale

•

VCF9049: social security. 3-point scale

For 1972 and 1976 there is no data to be had. 1984 has data for two questions, 2012 and
2016 have data for five, 1992 has data for eight, and the rest have data for six, although they are
not consistently the same questions. Since it is the larger question of spending that is of interest,
the specific areas of spending do not matter much and “public goods” like defense, police, and
schools are handled separately. An additive index would normally be inappropriate for this, so I
construct a quasi-averaged index instead, resetting the response values to a -1 to 1 scale, with 0
being understood as “keep it about the same” and generating a “socialspend” variable which
contains the sum of the other variables. Two cases need to be dealt with: NA and DK. Since the
non-post respondents have already been removed from the dataset, NA responses mean either
“no answer” or “not asked,” so I recode these to “missing.” “Don’t know” responses are not
equivalent to “no preference” and should not be included with the “about the same” Instead, I set
them to “missing” as it will have the least effect on the respondent’s overall preferences for
social spending and noting that the vast majority of the DK responses come from those
respondents in the non-ideologue category. In the final socialspend variable, I treat negative
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numbers (<0) as having overall or “on the whole” preferences for increased social spending and
positive numbers (>0) as having overall of “on the whole” preferences for decreasing social
spending. The expectation of conservative identifiers favoring decreased spending and liberal
identifiers favoring increased spending will be satisfied if this proves to be the case. 1984 is the
problematic administration due to the small number of spending questions, so later comparisons
will be done by including it and excluding to check its impact.
Spending for public goods can be approached in a similar way with VCF0843 (defense
spending, 1-7 scale), VCF0888 (spending for crime), and VCF0890 (spending for public
schools) as workable indicators. These issue questions appear consistently from 1984 onward.
IdeoAware Indicator Construction
The indicator is a revision of the RePass (2008) PTR indicator. The major revisions are
its extension to the full 1972-2016 range of ANES administrations76 and the modification of the
classification and coding of some responses. RePass was not exceptionally clear in the reasoning
behind his coding and construction decisions, so I try to “reverse engineer” that reasoning.
Step 1: dataset cleanup (clean copy of the 1948-2016 CDF)
•

The liberal-conservative question was first administered in 1972, so all cases prior
to 1972 are removed from the dataset. VCF0004 is the year of administration.

•

The indicator is a mix of pre- and post-election questions. Only post-election
respondents could have given responses to all questions, so any respondents who
did not complete the post-election portion are removed from the dataset. Note:
some versions of the CDF have the pre- and post-election flag variables
incorrectly labeled. In the version I used, VCF0013 is the flag for the presence of

76

RePass (2008) dealt almost exclusively with the 2004 time-series administration.
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post-election data but was mislabeled as a pre-election flag. Fixing required
relabeling VCF0013 and VCF0014 to match their data.
•

Some respondents were not asked certain questions. In 1972 (the first use of the
liberal/conservative self-placement question), for example, about 130 respondents
were presented with survey forms which did not include the lib-con question and
more than half of respondents (819 out of 1,555 respondents) in 2000 were not
asked to self-place on the liberal-conservative dimension. For other years, the
number of respondents who did not self-place for one reason or another is a
couple of dozen or less. These respondents (VCF0803==0) are removed from the
dataset, noting that this makes for a maximum N of 736 respondents for 2000, but
all other years are comfortably above 1,000 and most are above 1,500.

Step 2: Construct the Self_Place indicator (done for PTR, but not for IdeoAware)
•

The lib-con response set is a 1-7 scale. The IdeoAware indicator requires a 5point scale. Extremely and Liberal/Conservative are collapsed to a single
response (1). This would happen mathematically if the 5/7 conversion were
used, without the complication of decimal remainders. But it also works under
the idea that these two categories are more solidly at the poles, while “slight”
liberals/conservatives may be on the cusp of “moderate” or
liberal/conservative. It also makes for a simpler coding matrix. That last may
be a bad assumption (and bad practice), but inconsistency between issue
preference and the ideological identification has already been addressed, so
continuing the inconsistency falls into the category of (hopefully) not making
the bad situation worse.
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o It is worth noting that there are significant differences in identification
between GSS respondents and ANES respondents on the selfplacement question. Part of the inconsistency may be due to the
“haven’t through much about it” option given to ANES respondents,
but the only two categories where the numbers track closely in both
surveys are in the “slightly conservative” and “conservative”
placements. The remainder have enough difference between the lines
that there may be something else going on behind the scenes.
Step 3: Construct the ideological perception indicator (PerceivePartyLC)
•

Does the respondent have some minimal understanding of liberalism and
conservatism as political outlooks or positions? Two approaches are available.
The “are there important differences between the parties?” variable
(VCF0501) sheds some light on this question but may be more suited to the
partisanship or salient issues end of things than to ideology. Being able to
identify the Republican party as the more conservative of the two (VCF0502)
goes more to the ideology end of things (and follows Converse (1964) to a
rough approximation). In the CDF, the 2-part questions of the individual
administrations (“is one party more conservative than the other?” and “which
party is more conservative?”) are combined into a single indicator
(VCF0502). As with the “haven’t thought about it much” response offered on
the self-placement, this variable offers a “wouldn’t want to guess” option.
Using both variables might make for a more rigorous indicator, depending on
how the respondent understands “important differences,” but would
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significantly reduce the N for some administrations and might work to
conflate ideology with partisanship. I reserve VCF0501 for the examination of
partisan leanings to avoid this.
•

VCF0501 was not presented in 1974, 1978, or 1982 and not presented to all
respondents in 1972 (N=1100), 1984 (N=970), 1986 (N=1077), 1990
(N=969), or 1996 (N=746). (not done)

•

VCF0502 was not presented in 1974, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1986, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, or 2002, and not presented to all respondents in 1972 (N=1097),
1984 (N=966) or 1990 (N=968).

•

If combined, an indicator can be constructed for 1972, 1976, 1984, 1988,
1990, 1992, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. The 12-year gap from 1992 to 2004
is troubling.

Step 4: Final Coding for Ideological Awareness
•

The last piece sorts the respondents based on their awareness that the
Republicans are the more conservative party. As noted earlier, this is a
problematic decision considering the number of administrations where the
question was not asked. Codings in the previous steps are retained, but any
respondents who were not able to identify the Republicans as the more
conservative party at the national level are reclassified as non-ideologues.
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Appendix B: Partisanship-as-Identity Methodology
Partisanship and Identity
This can be treated like ideology and identity without the added complication of “what
does liberal/conservative mean,” but it raises some different questions. Superficially, the
respondent’s vote for president can be taken as verification of their true partisan leanings. This is
not a very satisfactory way of doing things because it makes some problematic assumptions, but
it is better than using House or Senate elections as a measure of leaning. Prior to the realignment
of the South in the late 80s and early 90s, there was no seriously functional Republican Party in
the South. This is still true in some cases. El Paso, for example, doesn’t really have a solidly
functioning Republican Party. In the 2018 midterm, most of the races for state senator and
representatives and local governments were uncontested Democrats, indicating the real electoral
competition happened during the primaries. So, if a voter did not participate in those (turnout for
primaries is typically around 25% to 30%), and they live in a district or county without a strongly
functioning two-party system, then presidential vote is only the least problematic of the bunch,
making it a Churchillian indicator (the worst, except for all the others).
Based on vote tallies for the 2018 midterm House elections, more than half of House
contests were won in districts where the victor got more than 60% of the vote. These types of
races can be considered “uncontested” as the opposing party failed to produce much more than a
token challenger. A few contests were close, but comfortable (55%-60%) and landslide (60%+)
margins were by far the more common. Senate contests were not much better. 13 of the 33
Senate seats were won by landslide margins, and 9 by comfortable margins, leaving only about a
third that were “close” contests (if a 10% margin counts as close).
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Two models will be necessary. Leaners need to be tested as being partisans and as being
independents.
Partisanship Indicator Methodology (Model 1)
Step 1: Clean up the CDF
•

Remove all non-Post respondents to ensure that all respondents have responses to
all questions within the limits of the contents of the individual surveys

•

VCF0013 and VCF0014 are mislabeled. VCF0013 holds the post-election flag, so
just needs to be relabeled to reflect this. (drop if VCF0013==0)

•

o 5,443 cases should be removed. All midterm administrations except 1954
and 2002 show only post-election data. The 1954 administration was
conducted in October and only had 27 questions, so is probably ignorable.
The other mid-term administrations appear to have been post-election
surveys with no pre-election wave (2002 may be the exception to this – a
really solid history of the ANES would be very helpful)
▪ 1952: 185
▪ 1954: 1139
▪ 1960: 72
▪ 1964: 121
▪ 1968: 209
▪ 1972: 420
▪ 1976: 339
▪ 1980: 206
▪ 1984: 268
▪ 1988: 265
▪ 1992: 230
▪ 1996: 180
▪ 2000: 252
▪ 2002: 165
▪ 2004: 146
▪ 2008: 220
▪ 2012: 404
▪ 2016: 622
Remove all non-responses to the partisanship indicator (VCF0301). This is a
problematic decision because some respondents initially indicated partisan
leaning (Democrat or Republican), but gave DK/Ref on strength of leaning, while
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others initially responded Independent, but gave DF/Ref on Democrat/Republican
leaning. Since this is a standard pre-election wave question, a third category is
respondents who did not complete the pre-election wave. Rather than try to
disentangle these three groups (the total N across all administrations is 1,015, with
about a third to half in the 1950s), it is simpler to just delete them. (drop if
VCF0301==0)
•

The ability to identify the Republicans as the more conservative party (VCF0502)
is unnecessary in the context of partisanship due to its ideological aspects.

•

Knowing that there are important differences between the parties (VCF0501)
raises an interesting question. If there are no important differences between the
parties, then what is the basis for identifying with one or the other? Is this
something like “Coke vs. Pepsi” or “Del Monte vs. Green Giant” where it’s
simply a brand preference or is it more like “My family has always been
Democrat (or Republican),” so tradition more than preference?
o Missing administrations: 1954, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1970, 1974, 2002

•

Feeling Thermometer for Democrats/Republicans (VCF0201 and VCF0202) is
present only for 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1980, and 1982)

•

Feeling Thermometer for Democratic Party (VCF0218) and Republican Party
(VCF0224) is present for all administrations between 1978 and 2016, except
2002.

•

Interesting question: do respondents see a difference between “Democrats” and
“Democratic Party” or “Republicans” and “Republican Party”? Two
administrations (1980 and 1982) where both were asked.
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•

Related question: how closely do respondents see Democrats (VCF0201),
Democratic Party (VCF0218), and Liberals (VCF0211), or Republicans
(VCF0202), Republican Party (VCF0224), and Conservatives (VCF0212) as
being synonymous? There is one administration (1980) where all three overlap.

•

Does partisan identification need to be collapsed into a smaller number of
categories (partisans and independents) or is leaving it at the 7-point scale
sufficient? For regression purposes, the 7-point will give more meaningful
marginal effects. For cross-tabs, smaller is better.

•

What about identifiers who do not see important differences between the parties?
There is no “non-ideologue” category for this, but the “important differences”
question might be used as a control/exclusionary flag, but that would require two
more models.

•

Two other indicators on partisanship: does the respondent care who wins? One
indicator for presidency (VCF0311) administered in presidential cycles, and one
for Congress (VCF0312) in midterm cycles (stops in 2008).

•

Question not in CDF: is it better to have split or unified control of government?
Interesting question because of the “it doesn’t matter” response option.

•

Regression results with Democratic Party (DV) and Partisanship (IV). Year-1 is
no control for “important differences,” Year-2 is restricting to “yes,” Year-3 is
“no/DK”. All exclude NA/DK/Ref for IV, DV, and controls.
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Effect of Partisanship on Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer
Year
ME
SE
N
R2
1980-1
-7.12***
0.25
1332
0.38
1980-2
-7.60***
0.30
798
0.45
1980-3
-6.00***
0.46
532
0.25
1984-1
-6.21***
0.19
1879
0.43
1984-2
-7.62***
0.32
593
0.50
1984-3
-5.86***
0.49
327
0.31
1986-1
-6.96***
0.18
2048
0.42
1986-2
-8.22***
0.32
492
0.57
1986-3
-5.26***
0.39
521
0.26
1988-1
-7.19***
0.21
1678
0.41
1988-2
-7.85***
0.25
1027
0.49
1988-3
-5.59***
0.38
649
0.25
1990-1
-6.01***
0.20
1850
0.33
1990-2
-6.55***
0.36
431
0.43
1990-3
-5.32***
0.41
486
0.26
1992-1
-7.04***
0.18
2158
0.41
1992-2
-7.57***
0.21
1325
0.50
1992-3
-5.84***
0.34
829
0.26
1994-1
-7.72***
0.19
1750
0.48
1994-2
-8.66***
0.23
921
0.61
1994-3
-5.83***
0.33
824
0.28
1996-1
-7.99***
0.22
1505
0.47
1996-2
-8.52***
0.35
481
0.55
1996-3
-6.39***
0.71
250
0.25
1998-1
-6.94***
0.25
1245
0.38
1998-2
-7.73***
0.30
728
0.48
1998-3
-5.34***
0.45
515
0.21
2000-1
-8.21***
0.22
1496
0.47
2000-2
-8.61***
0.24
1012
0.55
2000-3
-6.88***
0.49
483
0.29
2004-1
-7.87***
0.25
1028
0.49
2004-2
-8.06***
0.27
803
0.52
2004-3
-6.34***
0.62
223
0.32
2008-1
-8.91***
0.20
2025
0.51
2008-2
-9.36***
0.21
1536
0.57
2008-3
-6.60***
0.53
486
0.24
2012-1
-10.21***
0.12
5441
0.57
2012-2
-10.41***
0.12
4492
0.61
2012-3
-8.64***
0.42
928
0.30
2016-1
-10.28***
0.15
3579
0.56
2016-2
-10.60***
0.16
3026
0.60
2016-3
-6.99***
0.58
546
0.21
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
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Effect of Partisanship on Republican Party Feeling Thermometer
Year
ME
SE
N
R2
1980-1
5.37***
0.26
1328
0.25
1980-2
5.98***
0.31
797
0.31
1980-3
4.03***
0.45
529
0.13
1984-1
6.75***
0.22
1884
0.34
1984-2
7.55***
0.36
592
0.43
1984-3
4.71***
0.56
330
0.18
1986-1
6.43***
0.21
2054
0.31
1986-2
7.73***
0.39
492
0.45
1986-3
3.99***
0.43
521
0.15
1988-1
6.89***
0.23
1683
0.35
1988-2
7.52***
0.27
1029
0.43
1988-3
5.42***
0.42
652
0.21
1990-1
5.70***
0.23
1851
0.25
1990-2
6.95***
0.45
431
0.36
1990-3
3.51***
0.46
488
0.11
1992-1
6.27***
0.20
2162
0.31
1992-2
6.99***
0.24
1325
0.39
1992-3
4.53***
0.37
833
0.15
1994-1
6.06***
0.20
1745
0.34
1994-2
7.50***
0.24
919
0.52
1994-3
3.48***
0.34
821
0.11
1996-1
6.58***
0.23
1498
0.36
1996-2
7.25***
0.36
481
0.45
1996-3
5.03***
0.64
247
0.20
1998-1
6.93***
0.27
1236
0.35
1998-2
7.64***
0.33
727
0.43
1998-3
5.19***
0.47
507
0.19
2000-1
6.75***
0.24
1493
0.36
2000-2
7.15***
0.26
1013
0.43
2000-3
5.50***
0.52
480
0.19
2004-1
8.71***
0.28
1027
0.49
2004-2
9.22***
0.30
803
0.55
2004-3
6.18***
0.77
222
0.23
2008-1
7.99***
0.22
2018
0.39
2008-2
8.45***
0.24
1533
0.46
2008-3
5.41***
0.58
482
0.15
2012-1
9.04***
0.13
5434
0.48
2012-2
9.38***
0.13
4489
0.53
2012-3
6.01***
0.43
924
0.17
2016-1
8.17***
0.16
3565
0.42
2016-2
8.44***
0.16
3014
0.47
2016-3
5.41***
0.58
544
0.14
Source: ANES CDF, 1948-2016
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